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Preface 
This new research project at IIASA is concerned with modeling technological and 
organisational change; the broader economic developments that are associated with 
technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes by which economic agents -- 
first of all, business firms -- acquire and develop the capabilities to generate, imitate and 
adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate dynamics -- at the 
levels of single industries and whole economies -- engendered by the interactions among 
agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling 
techniques. However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most 
fruitful when attention is paid to the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims 
to address: therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized 
facts' concerning corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 
'demography' of firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary 
differential and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts 
have taken advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed 
more traditional mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling 
technological and economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known 
about the similarities and differencers of technical advance in different fields and industries 
and there is some understanding of the key variables that lie behind those differences. A 
number of studies have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves 
with technology. In addition to empirical work at the technology or sector level, the last 
decade has also seen a great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured 
technical advance at the level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research 
now exists on the facts that seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across 
the range of nations, with the dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates 
of growth of income in different countries, with the diverse national institutional 
arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought to address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical 
work described above often has been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that 
needed to be explained. The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the 
microeconomic evidence concerning for example dynamic increasing returns in learning 
activities or the persistence of particular sets of problem-solving routines within business 
firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and size-distributions -- approximately log- 
normal; all the way to the evidence regarding the time-series properties of major economic 
aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical work and the empirical 
phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project is that the chances 
of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can be greatly 
enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand the 
empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and 
organisations learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by 
which interactive environments -- often markets -- winnow out a population whose members 
have different attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of 
statistical patterns, regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the 
two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently at IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises 
workshops and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on 
evolutionary modeling, computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. The 
research will focus upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
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Learning In Evolutionary Environments 
Giovanni Dosi, Luig i Marengo, 
and Giorgio Fagiolo 
1. Introduction 
In the most generic terms, learning may occur in all circumstances whereby agents have an 
imperfect understanding of the world in which they operate - either due to lack of information 
about it, or, more fundamentally, to an imprecise knowledge of its structure -; or, when they 
master only a limited repertoire of actions in order to cope with whatever problem they face - 
as compared to the set of actions that an omniscient observer would be able to conceive -; or, 
finally, when they have only a blurred and changing understanding of what their goals and 
preferences are. 
It is straightforward that learning, so defined, is an ubiquitous characteristic of most 
economic and, generally, social environments, with the remarkable exception of those 
postulated by the most extreme forms of economic modelling, such as those assuming rational 
expectations or canonical game-theoretic equilibria. But, even in the latter cases, - and 
neglecting any issue of empirical realism of the underlying assumptions -, it is natural to ask 
how did agents learn in the first place about e.g. the "true model" of the world in a RE set-up, 
or the extensive form of a particular game? And, moreover, in the widespread case of 
multiple equilibria, how do agents select among them (i.e. how do they learn how to converge 
to one of them)? 
Of course, learning acquires even greater importance in explicitly evolutionary environments 
(which we believe be indeed the general case), where a) heterogeneous agents systematically 
display various forms of "bounded rationality"; b) there is a persistent appearance of 
novelties, both as exogenous shocks, and, more important, as the result of technological, 
behavioural and organisational innovations by the agents themselves; c) markets (and other 
interaction arrangements) perform as selection mechanisms; d) aggregate regularities are 
primarily emergent properties stemming from out-of-equilibrium interactions (more detailed 
discussions are in Dosi and Nelson (1994), Nelson (1995), Coriat and Dosi (1995b)). 
The purpose of this work is to present a sort of selective guide to an enormous and diverse 
literature on learning processes in economics in so far as they capture at least some of the 
foregoing evolutionary aspects. Clearly, this cannot be a thorough survey. Rather, we shall 
just refer to some examples of each genre, trying to show their links and differences, setting 
them against a sort of ideal framework of "what one would like to understand about 
learning...". This allows also an easier mapping of a wide and largely unexplored research 
agenda. A significant emphasis shall be put on learning models, in their bare-bone formal 
structure, but we shall always refer to the (generally richer) non-formal theorising about the 
same objects. 
Needless to say, we are exclusively concerned here with positive (i.e. descriptive) theories of 
learning: standard "rational-choice" models might well go a longer way as normative tools. 
In Section 2 we set the scene for the discussion that follows by reference to the usual 
decision-theoretic archetype, briefly outlining many compelling reasons why one needs to go  
well beyond it in order to account for most learning processes. Once we do  that, however, a 
sharp and unified - albeit probably irrelevant - paradigm is lost. Learning happens in different 
cognitive and behavioural domains, has different objects and most likely occurs through 
somewhat different processes. Relatedly, we propose that a few basic empirical regularities 
on cognition, decision-making and learning stemming from disciplines outside economics - 
ranging from cognitive psychology to sociology, etc. - should be among the "building blocks" 
of an emerging theory of agency (cf. Section 3). Some taxonomic exercises are a useful 
introductory device. These we shall present in Section 4. A taxonomy of learning dynamics, 
and the restrictions on its domain, helps so in grouping and assessing various classes of 
learning models (cf. Section 4). In particular, a useful distinction appears to be whether one 
retains some elements of Savage's original "Small World assumption" (Savage (1954)) - in 
essence, the idea of a finite list of objects exhaustively present from the start in the "heads" of 
learning agents-. This is the case of learning representations through "evolutionary games" 
and other mechanisms of adaptation via environmental reinforcement. Conversely, lower 
restrictions on the domain of learning and on the dimensionality of the state space may well 
entail open ended evolutionary dynamics involving not only adaptation but also discovery and 
emergence of novelty: in Section 5, we shall compare different formal approaches in these 
different veins. 
The general thrust of the argument, there and throughout this work, shall be that learning 
crucially entails cognitive activities of construction and modification of mental models and 
behavioural patterns hardly reducible to well defined problems of choice under imperfect 
information and probabilisable risk. 
Some achievements and limitations of current learning models within this perspective and a 
few other broad topics of investigation such as the relationship between learning and selection 
in evolutionary models; the possible tension between individual and collective learning; the 
specificity of organisational learning, shall be outlined in Section 6. 
2. Beyond "Rational Choice" and Bayesian Learning: Some 
Preliminaries 
As well known, the standard decision-theoretic model depicts agency (and, in primis, 
economic agency) as a problem of choice where rational actors select, among a set of 
alternative courses of action, the one which will produce (in expectation) the maximum 
outcome as measured against some utility yardstick. In that, agents are postulated to know the 
entire set of possible events of "nature", all possible actions which are open to them, and all 
notional outcomes of the mapping between actions and events (or at least come to know them 
after some learning process). Clearly, these are quite demanding assumptions on knowledge 
embodied into or accessible to the agents - which hardly apply to complex and changing 
environments. In fact, they cannot apply almost by definition in all environments where 
innovations of some kind are allowed to occur - irrespective of whether they relate to 
technologies, behavioural repertoires or organisational arrangements: as Kenneth Arrow has 
been reminding for some time, if an innovation is truly an innovation it could not have been 
into the set of events that all agents were able to contemplate before the innovation actually 
occurred ... 
Moreover, equally demanding are the implicit assumptions concerning the procedural 
rationality involved in the decision process. 
As a paradigmatic illustration, take the usual decision-theoretic sequence leading from 1) 
representation/"understanding" of the environment (conditional on whatever available 
"information"), to 2) evaluationJjudgement; 3) choice; 4) actions, and, ultimately, 5) 
consequences - determined e.g. by the stochastic pairing of actions and "events of nature" 
and/or actions by other agents. 
We argue at some greater length elsewhere (Dosi et al. (1994)) that in order for this 
"rationalist" view to hold at least two assumptions are crucial. 
First, the linearity of that sequence must strictly hold. That is, one must rule out the 
possibility of reversing, so to speak, the procedural sequence. For example, one cannot have 
preferences and representations which adapt to an action that has already been undertaken. 
and, likewise, one must assume that consequences do not influence preferences (i.e. 
preferences are not endogenous). 
Second, at each step of the process agents must be endowed with, or able to build, the 
appropriate algorithm in order to tackle the task at hand - being it representing the 
environment, evaluating alternatives or choosing courses of action, etc. 
There are, indeed, a few rather compelling reasons why these assumptions might be a 
misleading starting point for any positive theory of learning and choice. 
Complexity and nrocedural rationality 
On purely theoretical grounds, computability theory provides some sort of dividing line 
between problems which are solvable by means of a general recursive procedures in non- 
exponential times and problems that are not (for discussions and some results cf. Lewis 
(1985a) and (1985b), Casti (1992), Andersen (1994), Dosi and Egidi (1991), Dosi et al. 
(1994)). It is plausible to use such a criteria to establish the upper bound of the complexity of 
the problems for which the theory is allowed to assume that the agents "naturally" possess the 
appropriate problem-solving algorithm (or are able to access them in finite time). It happens, 
however, that many decision tasks within and outside the economic domain fall outside of 
this category (Lewis (1986), Dosi et al. (1994)). 
We do not mean to overemphasise this point. After all, human agents tackle every day, with 
varying degrees of success, highly complex and "hard" problems (in the sense of 
computability theory). However, we do claim that the understanding of how and when they 
happen to do it is a major challenge for any theory of cognition and learning, which cannot be 
written out by assuming that agents embody from the start a notionally unbounded procedural 
rationality'. Note that all this equally applies to the "procedural rationality" of both decision- 
processes and of learning. "Rationality" of the latter implies the availability of some 
inferential machinery able to extract the "correct" information from environmental signals 
(Bayes rule being one of them, and possibly also the most demanding in terms of what the 
agents must know from the start about alternative hypotheses on what the world "really is"). 
But, again, our foregoing argument implies that such an inferential machinery cannot be 
I In this respect, the reader might notice that the view suggested here tends to imply a somewhat more radical 
departure from fully "rational" theories of decision than Herbert Simon's path-breaking works on "bounded 
rationality" Simon ((1976), (1981) and (1988)), in that it does not only demand demands a constructive theory 
of the procedures themselves by which agents develop their representations and action rules, but it allows the 
possibility of persistently incoherent procedures (see below). 
innocently postulated. Indeed, outside the rather special domain of "small worlds" whose 
structure is known ex ante to the agents, a few impossibility theorems from computation 
theory tell us that a generic inferential procedure does not and cannot exit (More on this point 
in Dosi and Egidi (1991), Dosi et al. (1994), Binmore (1990)). 
What said so far mainly implies restrictions on the applicability of the canonical "rational" 
account of learning and decision-making. The bottom line is that the demands it makes in 
terms of a priori knowledge of the environment and "algorithmic endowments" of the agents 
cannot be met, even in principle, except for the simplest decision problems. 
But, then, how do we theoretically depict agency and learning? 
"As ... i f '  inter~retations of rational behaviour. 
One possible strategy basically involves a continuing commitment to "rational" micro- 
foundations of economic interactions, together with a radical redefinition of the status of 
rationality assumptions themselves. 
"Rationality" - however defined -, rather than being an approximation to the empirical 
behaviours of purposeful, cognitively quite sophisticated, agents, is assumed to be, so to 
speak, an "objective" property of behaviours in equilibrium. Add the presumption that (most) 
observed behaviours are indeed equilibrium ones. And finally postulate some dynamics of 
individual adaptation or intra-population selection leading there. What one gets is some 
version of the famous "as ... i f '  hypothesis, suggested by Milton Friedman (1953) and 
rejuvenated in different fashions by more recent efforts to formalise learningladaptation 
processes whose outcome is precisely the "rationality" assumed from the start (archetypical 
examples of this faith can be found in Sargent (1993) and Marimon (1995)). 
A thorough, critical, discussion of the "as ... i f '  epistemology has been put forward by Sidney 
Winter, in various essays (e.g. Winter (1971)) to which we refer the interested reader (and see 
also Silverberg (1 988), Andersen (1 994) and Hodgson (1 988)). 
For our purposes here let us just note the following: 
i. Any "as ... i f '  hypothesis on rationality , taken seriously, is bound to involve quite a few 
restrictions similar to those briefly overviewed earlier with reference to more 
"constructive" notions of rational behaviours, simply transposed into a more "ecological" 
dimension - being it the "ecology" of minds, ideas, organisations, populations, etc. -. That 
is, canonical rationality, stricto sensu, postulates that one decides and acts by purposefully 
using the appropriate procedures (or by learning them in purposeful, procedurally 
coherent, ways). "As ... if"'s of any kind apparently relax the demands on what agents 
must consciously know about the environment, their goals, the process of achieving them, 
but at the same time must assume some background mechanism that generates the 
available alternatives - which must include the "correct" ones. However, without any 
further knowledge of the specific mechanisms, such a possibility remains a very dubious 
shortcut. And it is utterly unlikely when there are infinite alternatives which ought to be 
scanned. 
ii. While "realistic" interpretations of rationality put most of the burden of explanation upon 
the power of inbuilt cognition, "as ... i f '  accounts shift it to selection dynamics - no matter 
whether driven by behavioural reinforcements alike salivating Pavlovian dogs, or by 
differential reproduction of traits within populations.' But, then, supporters of the view 
2 Incidentally note that the outcomes of pure "Pavlovian" - i.e. reinforcement - driven, consciously blind -, and 
"Bayesian" - apparently sophisticated rational - dynamics can be shown to be sometimes asymptotically 
ought to show, at the very least, robust convergence properties of some empirically 
justifiable selection dynamics. As it stands, in our view, nothing like that is in sight. On 
the contrary, except for very special set-ups, negative results are abundant in e.g. 
evolutionary games or other forms of decentralised interactions - no matter whether 
applied to biology or economics -: path-dependency cannot easily be disposed of; cyclical 
limit behaviours might occur (cf. Posch (1994) and Kaniovski et al. (1996)), etc. And all 
this appears even before accounting for environments which are genuinely evolutionary in 
the sense that novelties can emerge over time. 
Of course, the "as ... if" theoretical enterprise in its wildest formulation does not set to itself 
any falsification challenge. Any kind of observation-based discipline on behavioural 
assumptions tends to be contemptuously dismissed as "ad-hoc". Thus, the question of "what 
do people do and how do they learn" is generally transformed into another one, namely 
"given whatever behaviour, and, knowing that, of course (?!), such a behaviour is an 
equilibrium one, how can I - the theorist - rationalise it as the outcome of some adaptive 
process? (Mr. Pangloss, theologians, and marxist-leninists would not have any query with 
such an exercise...). 
Bounded Rationalitv 
Another major perspective maintains that cognitive and behavioural assumptions have to keep 
some empirical foundations and, thus, when needed, account for constraints on memory, on 
the maximum levels of complexity of problem-solving algorithms, and on computational 
time. It is, in a broad sense, the bounded rationality approach, pioneered by the works of 
Simon (cf. (1986)) and developed in quite different fashions in e.g. organisational studies 
(starting from March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963)) ; evolutionary theories 
(building on Nelson and Winter (1982) ; see also Dosi et al. (1988), Andersen (1994), 
Hodgson (1993)) ; "evolutionary games" (for a rather technical overview, cf. Weibull 
(1995) ; for insightful remarks on bounded rationality and games in general, Kreps (1996) 
and also in otherwise quite orthodox macroeconomics see e.g. Sargent (1993)~). Again, this is 
not the place to undertake any review of this vast literature. However, few comments are 
required. 
Of course, the very idea of "bounds" on rationality implies that, at least in finite time, agents 
so represented fall short of full substantively rational behaviours, the latter involving among 
other things, a) a full knowledge of all possible contingencies ; b) an exhaustive exploration 
of the entire decision tree ; and c) a correct appreciation of the utility evaluations of all 
mappings between actions, events and outcomes (Simon (1986) and (1988)). 
Given that, a first issue concerns the characterisation of the origins and nature of the 
"boundedness" itself. It is not at all irrelevant whether it relates mainly to limitations on the 
equivalent (the review in Suppes ((1995a) and (1995b)) develops much older intuitions from behaviourist 
psychology - e.g. Bush and Mosteller (1955)) ... However, in order for that equivalence to hold reinforcements 
must operate in the same direction as the Bayesian inferential machinery - which is indeed a hard demand to 
make. The so-called condition of "weak monotonicity" in the dynamics of adjustment that one generally finds 
in evolutionary games is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition to this effect. Moreover, a subtle question 
regards the interpretative value that one should attribute to asymptotic results: what do they tell us about finite 
time properties of empirical observations? (We shall briefly come back to the issue below). 
3 ~ o t e ,  however, that in some interpretations - including Sargent's and others discussed in section (iv) below - 
boundedly rational behaviours are considered mainly in so far as they entail convergence to some pre-defined 
equilibrium outcomes. Hence they turn out at the end being primarily instrumental building blocks of some 
dynamics vindicating, in the intentions of the proponents, an "as ... if '  story. 
memory that agents carry over from the past, or to algorithmic complexity, or to limited 
ability of defining preferences over (expected) outcomes ... Or, more radically, couldn't it be 
due to the fact that agents get it basically wrong (in terms of representation of the 
environment, etc.) ? 
Here the theory faces a subtle but crucial crossroads. An alternative - unfortunately found too 
often in economic models, and especially but not only, in game theory - is to select the 
bounded-rationality assumptions with extreme casualness, suspiciously well-fitted to the 
mathematics the author knows and to the results one wants to obtain. We have no problem in 
associating ourselves to those who denounce the ad-hocry of the procedure. The other 
alternative entails the acknowledgement of an empirical discipline upon the restrictions one 
puts upon the purported rationality of the agents. No doubt, we want to advocate here the 
scientific soundness of this procedure, notwithstanding the inevitable "phenomenological" 
diversity of cognitive and behavioural representations one is likely to get. That is, whether 
and how "rationality is bound" is likely to depend on the nature of the decision problem at 
hand, the content in which the decision-maker is placed, the pre-existing learning skills of the 
agents, etc. Taxonomical exercises are inevitable, with their seemingly clumsy reputation. 
But, in a metaphor inspired by Keith Pavitt, this is a bit like the comparison of Greek to 
modern chemistry. The former, based on the symmetry of just four elements, was very 
elegant, grounded in underlying philosophical principles, utterly irrelevant, and, from what 
we know nowadays, essentially wrong. The latter is clumsy, taxonomic, and for a long time 
(until quantum mechanics) lacking underlying foundations , but is certainly descriptively and 
operationally more robust .... 
A second major issue, regards procedural rationality. Granted the bounds on "substantive" 
rational agency, as defined above, when and to what extent should one maintain any 
assumption of coherent purposefulness and logical algorithmic consistency of the agents ? 4 ~ n  
a first approximation, H. Simon's approach suggests such a theoretical commitment 
(associated indeed to major contributions to the identification of constructive procedures for 
learning and problem-solving in this vein ; cf. Newel1 and Simon (1972) and Simon (1976)). 
However, even procedural consistency might not be at all a generic property of empirical 
agents (including, of course, us !). And a lot of evidence from most social disciplines seems 
to point in this direction (see also below). 
Third, and relatedly, the very notion of "bounded rationality" commits from the start to an 
implicit idea that "full rationality" is the underlying yardstick for comparison. In turn, this 
implies the possibility of identifying some metrics upon which "boundedness" and, 
dynamically, learning efforts could be measured and assessed. In quite a few circumstances 
this can be fruitfully done 'but in others it might not be possible either in practice or even in 
principle. In particular, this applies to search and learning in complex functional spaces (as 
many problems within and outside the economic arena commonly do) 6. And of course this is 
also the case of most problems involving discovery and/or adaptation to novelty. 
4 ~ o t e  that procedural rationality requires all the "linearity assumptions" mentioned above (ruling out for 
example state-dependent preferences) and also consistent search heuristics (allowing, for example, assessment 
rules along any decision tree which at least in probability lead in the "right" direction). 
'promising results stem from a better understanding of the formal structure of problem-solving heuristics (c.f. 
e.g. Pearl (1984), Vassilakis (1995) and, in a suggestive experimentally-based instance, Cohen and Bacdayan 
(1994) and Egidi (1996)). See also below. 
6 ~ o r  example, in Dosi et al. (1994) we consider quantity- and price-setting as cases to the point. 
Since indeed these features are typical of evolutionary environments, an implication is that 
one might need to go well beyond a restricted notion of "bounded rationality", simply 
characterised as an imperfect approximation to a supposedly "full" one - which, in these 
circumstances, one is even unable to define what it should precisely be. But then, again, how 
does one represent learning agents in these circumstances ? 
3. "Stylized Facts" From Cognitive and Social Sciences as 
Building Blocks of Evolutionary Theories of Learning 
Our somewhat radical suggestion is that evolutionary theories ought to make a much greater 
and systematic use of the evidence from other cognitive and social sciences as sort of 
"building blocks" for the hypotheses on cognition, learning and behaviours that one adopts. 
We fully realise that such a perspective almost inevitably entails the abandonment of any 
invariant axiomatics of decision and choice. But, to paraphrase R. Thaler (1992) this boils 
down again to the alternative between being "vaguely right" or "precisely wrong": we 
certainly advocate the former (however, compare Marimon (1995) for a sophisticated 
contrary view). 
In this respect, the discussion of routines as foundational behavioural assumptions of 
evolutionary models in Nelson and Winter (1982) is an excellent example of the methodology 
we have in mind, unfortunately not pursued enough in subsequent evolutionary studies (For a 
discussion of the state-of-the-art in the field, see Cohen et al. (1995)). There are, however, 
many other fields where a positive theory of learning in economics can draw, ranging from 
cognitive and social psychology all the way to anthropology and sociology of knowledge." 
Cognitive - cate~ories and problem-solving. 
A crucial aspect of learning regards most often cognition, that is the process by which 
decision makers form and modify representations in order to make some sense of a reality 
which is generally too complex and uncertain to be fully understood. Hence, the necessity to 
acknowledge the existence (and persistence) of a systematic gap between the agents cognitive 
abilities and "reality" (were there an omniscient observer able to fully grasp it). Such a gap 
can take at least, two often interrelated forms 7, namely, first, knowledge gap, involving 
incomplete, fuzzy or simply wrong representations of the environment and, second, a 
problem-solving gap between the complexity of the tasks agents face and their capabilities on 
accomplishing them. 
Regarding both, evolutionary theories of learning might significantly benefit from that branch 
of cognitive studies concerned with the nature and changes of categories and mental models 
(in different perspectives, cf. Johnson-Laird (1983) and (1993), Lakoff (1987), Holland et al. 
(1986), Margolis (1987), and the presentation of a few alternative theories in Mayer (1992)). 
It is crucial to notice that, if one accepts any "mental model" view, learning cannot be 
reduced to information-acquisition (possibly cum Bayesian processing of it), but rather is 
centred around the construction of new cognitive categories and "models of the world" (Few 
studies in economics have explicitly taking this road: one of them is the promising attempt in 
7 ~ e i n e r  (1983) introduces a similar concept which he calls the "C-D (competence - difficulty) gap". In his 
definition such a gap reflects the agent's imperfect capabilities to correctly process the available information 
and act reliably. Heiner's C-D gap does not properly belong to the realm of cognitive gaps, but it rather 
capture their behavioural consequences. 
Tordjman (1996) to interpret the dynamics of financial markets in this framework ; see also 
Marengo and Tordjman (1996) and Palmer et al. (1984)). 
In turn, a robust evidence shows that cognitive categories are no clear-cut constructions with 
sharp boundaries and put together in fully consistent interpretative models. Rather, they seem 
to display (in all our minds !) blurred contours, shaded by an intrinsic fuzziness, held around 
some cognitively guiding "prototypes", and organised together in ill-structured systems kept 
operational also via a lot of default hierarchies (cf. on all those points Lakoff (1987), Holland 
et al. (1986), Tversky and Kahneman (1982), Kahneman and Tversky (1986), Griffin and 
Tversky (1992), Marengo (1996), Margolis (1987), Marengo and Tordjman (1996), Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1985)).~ 
Framing and social embeddedness. 
Cognitive categories - it has been repeatedly shown - go together with various mechanisms of 
by which information is interpreted and also rendered operationally meaningful to 
the decision-makers (cf. Kahneman et al. (1982), Borcherding et al. (1990), March (1994)). 
Frames appear to be indeed an ubiquitous feature of both decision-making and learning. What 
one understands is filtered by the cognitive categories that one holds and the repertoires of 
elicited problem-solving skills depend on the ways the problem itself is framed. That is, 
framing effects occurs along all stages of the decision process - affecting representations, 
judgements and the selection of behaviours (cf. Kahneman et a1 (1982), and, concerning the 
patterns of activation of experts' skills, Ericsson and Smith (1991)). As James March put it, 
Decisions are framed by beliefs that define the problem to be addressed, the information that must be 
collected, and the dimensions that must be evaluated. Decision makers adopt paradigms to tell 
themselves what perspective to take on a problem, what questions should be asked, and what 
technologies should be used to ask the questions. Such frames focus attention and simplify analysis. 
They direct attention to different options and different preferences. A decision will be made in one way 
if it is framed as a problem of maintaining profits and in a different way if it is framed as a problem of 
maintaining market share. A situation will lead to different decisions if it is seen as being about "the 
value of innovation" rather than "the importance of not losing face" (March (1994), p. 14). 
Note that in this view, "frames" include a set of (non-necessarily consistent) beliefs over 
"what the problem is" and the goals that should be achieved in that case ; cognitive categories 
deemed to be appropriate to the problem ; and a related menu of behavioural repertoires. 
Moreover, framing mechanisms appear at different levels of cognitive and behavioural 
observation: they do so in rather elementary acts of judgement and choice, but are also a 
general organising principle of social experience and collective interactions (Bateson (1972), 
Goffman (1974)).0ne can intuitively appreciate also the links between framing processes and 
social embeddedness of both cognition and action 9 .  
4, Prototypization" is easy to intuitively understand: you would give a sparrow rather than a penguin as an 
example of what a bird is ... But with that it is also easier to understand the basic ambiguity of boarderliners , 
fuzziness and categorical attributions by default (how should one treat a duck-billed platypus?, as a mammal? 
or should one create a separate category, that of ovoviviparous?...). A discussion of these issues bearing on 
economic judgements and behaviours is in Tordjman (1996). 
9 On the notion of "social embeddedness" as from contemporary economic sociology, see Granovetter (1985) 
and several contributions in Smelser and Swedberg (1994). A discussion quite germane to the argument 
developed here is in Tordjman (1996). 
Frames - in the broad definition given above - have long been recognised in the sociological 
and anthropological literature (whatever name is used to refer to them) as being grounded in 
the collective experience of the actors and in the history of the institutions in which agency is 
nested lo. 
Indeed, embeddedness seems to go a striking long way and affect even the understanding and 
use of cognitively basic categories such as that of causality and the very processes by which 
humans undertake basic operations such as inferences, generalisations, deductions, etc. 
(Lakoff (1987), Luria (1976)). 
Heuristics in iud~ement  and learning. 
We were mentioning above the issue of procedural coherence in decision-making and 
learning (which, to repeat, is a quite separate one from the sophistication in terms of memory 
and computing power - of the procedures themselves). It happens that an overwhelming 
evidence points at the widespread use by empirical agents of heuristics which may well lead 
to systematic biases in judgements and action-choices as compared to the predictions of 
"rational" decision theoretic models (cf. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) and also 
Kahneman and Tversky (1 986), Slovic et al. (1989), Borcherding et al. (1990), Thaler (1992), 
Shafir and Tversky (1992)). 
Broadly defined, heuristics are methods, rules or criteria guiding e.g. representation, 
judgement or action - and include simple rules-of-thumb but also much more sophisticated 
methods explicitly evoking the use of mental categories -.It is impossible to provide here any 
thorough account of the findings in this area (The classic reference is the cited Kahneman, 
Slovic and Tversky (1982)). L,et us just recall heuristics such as representativeness (i.e. 
evaluating whatever observation in terms of distance from some prototype or modal case) " ; 
availability (i.e. ... what is primarily in your mind is what is in your sight ...) ; and anchoring 
(initial conditions, either related to the way the problem is posed or the experience of the 
agent influence the final judgement). Other observed phenomena - touching, together, 
representations, choices and the perceived utility of the latter - include status quo biases 
(entailing, for choice under risk, risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses - as 
formalised by Kahneman and Tversky through "prospect theory" -) ; overconfidence and 
illusion of control (associated with the overestimation of one's own capabilities and the 
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neglect potentially relevant outside information ; and, more generally systematic 
"incoherence" vis-a-vis any canonical model of utility-based decision under uncertainty). 
Note that all these cognitive and behavioural regularities apply to both decisions (as taken 
once-and-for-all) and learning processes (for example, representativeness heuristics lead to 
learning patterns at odds with Bayesian predictions ; and illusion of control is likely to entail 
information-censuring and escalating commitments in the face of unfavourable outcomes...). 
It is straightforward that those cognitive and behavioural patterns openly conflict with 
"procedural rationality" - which, as mentioned earlier, is a fundamental necessary condition 
for a standard decision-theoretic account of agency. It is also remarkable that the foregoing 
evidence is drawn to a considerable extent for experiments that are simple enough to provide 
10 Within an enormous literature, just think of a good deal of the sociological tradition influenced by the works 
of Talcott Parson or of the classic Bourdieu (1977); in anthropology, among others, cf. the discussions of 
"embeddedness" by Karl Polanyi ((1944) and (1957); and Geertz (1963); see also Edgerton (1985)). 
ll~ordjman (1996) discusses in this light speculative expectations. 
I2  Cf. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) and Dosi and Lovallo (1995). 
a corresponding "correct" decision-theoretic answer (i.e. procedurally coherent, making the 
best use of the available information and in accordance to some supposedly basic preference 
axioms)I3. And in fact, a lot of the emphasis has been put upon the biases that all this entails, 
as measured against the canonical normative yardstick. However, together with such (indeed 
crucial) exercises of empirical falsification, our impression is that not enough has been done 
in terms development of alternative theories of cognition and action (Kahneman-Tversky's 
"prospect theory" being one of the few exceptions in a wider puzzle...). More than that: it 
might well be that so-called "biases" emerging in relatively simple decision set-ups could be 
revealing clues about cognition and behaviours in all other genuinely evolutionary 
circumstances which are common to human decision makers (whether individuals or 
organisations): .. after all, pushing it to the extreme, the collective evolution of human 
cultures has not been drawn from repeated trials on lotteries but on quite diverse experiences 
having nonetheless in common uniqueness features, out of which our cognition and beliefs 
had to make some precarious sense, ... from the threats in the forest to deaths of the relatives, 
14 from unexpected kin's violence to the discovery of fire and microprocessors ... . 
Endogenous Preferences. 
The separation from the previous point is somewhat arbitrary: indeed, the just mentioned 
heuristics and behavioural patterns often entail preferences which are state - dependent. Status 
quo biases are a case to the point: the reference is not some invariant utility - however defined 
- but "... where I was, what I had, etc., at time t minus one ..." 15. Moreover, it has been shown, 
the framing of the problem shapes revealed preferences (a huge literature in the field of 
marketing points in this direction, but particularly sharp experiments are in Kahneman et al. 
(1991)) and so do authority relations (cf. Milgram (1974)). 
Endogenous preference may be often driven by the attempts to reduce regret and cognitive 
dissonance (cf. Festinger (1957)): that is, as we put it jokingly in Dosi and Metcalfe (1991) 
citing a pop song from the 601s, "...if you cannot be with the one you love, love the one you 
are with ... !". And, finally, of course, endogeneity of preference is likely to stem from social 
13 Incidentally, an issue that is seldom raised, and that unfortunately we shall not be able to discuss here either, 
is whether the "rationality" of decision and learning is assessed procedurally at each elicited step of the 
process or whether it is black-boxed and just evaluated in terms of coherence of final (expected 
utilitieslrevealed preferences) outcomes. It is a matter bearing some resemblance to the "as ... if '  discussion, 
and also to entrenched debates in psychology between "behaviourist" and "cognitivist" views (whether 
"strong", $I - la Chomsky, or much weaker ones $I - la Johnson-Laird or Lakoff ... ). We do not have the arrogant 
casualness by which many practitioners of economics switch from one to the other. However, just note that the 
experimental results on heuristics, etc. are equally damaging for the defences of standard rationality in both 
view. So, for example, not only one finds "cognitive incoherence" but also revealed behaviours might well 
display "pessimisation" (!) as opposed to "maximisation" of utility (Herrstein and Prelec (1991)). 
14 To our, limited, knowledge, one of the few exploratory attempts to positively account for "rational biases" as 
crucial clues on cognitive patterns in Margolis ( 1987). Totally sharing the idea that they should not be simply 
dismissed as pathologies (cf. Tordjman (1996)), in another work it is suggested that they could indeed provide 
a crucial collective evolutionary role, at least with regard to a particular one (i.e. overconfidence and illusion 
of control) (Dosi and Lovallo (1995), see also below). 
15 Which, of course, is in open violation of any standard, utility - based, decision - theoretic approach, whereby 
preferences are supposed to be defined on levels and not history-dependent variations and, moreover, are 
supposed to change on a time scale that is significantly slower than decisions and random occurrences of 
"nature". 
imitation and other forms of social interactions (such as Veblenian "conspicuous 
consumption" and "snob effects", etc. ;: an early discussion is in Leibenstein (1950))16. 
Collective Beliefs. Behaviours and learning. 
What said so far on cognition, judgement, etc. applies in principle also to all set-ups where 
individual agents may be assumed, in a first approximation, to act as insulated entities 
(notwithstanding, of course, the whole experience of socialisation they carry with them...). 
Other circumstances, however, are explicitly and immediately social: multiple-actors 
decision-making, such as those required by "teams", economic organisations and other 
institutions belong to this group (for a thorough discussion, cf. March (1988 and 1994). 
Once more, it would be futile to try to review the enormous literature in the field. Let us just 
offer a few comments. 
First, the evidence suggests that, if anything, collective decision making rather than curbing 
the judgmental "biases" mentioned earlier (say, via some equivalent of a "law of large 
numbers") tends on the contrary to reinforce them (Lovallo (1996), March (1994)). 
Second, the "opaqueness" of the relationship between beliefs, behaviours and outcomes 
undermines the usefulness of representing multi-actor choice in terms of the canonical, linear, 
sequence outlined at the beginning of section (ii). Rather the general case seems to fit quite 
well the observation of Purkitt and Dyson (1990), who - describing the decision process 
during the Cuban missile crisis - note the general lack of "explicit linkages between 
information, a sense of the problem and problem responses" ( ! !) (Purkitt and Dyson (1990), 
p. 363). On the contrary, the archetypical decision-process, and, dynamically, the archetypical 
learning process, might fit quite well the garbage can model (Cohen, March and Olsen 
(1972)). That is, 
"in a garbage can process, it is assumed that there are no exogenous, time-dependent arrivals of choice 
opportunities, problems, solutions, and decision-makers. Problem, and solutions are attached to choices, 
and thus to each other, not because of any means-ends linkage but because of their temporal proximity. 
At the limit, for example, almost any solution can be associated to almost any problem - provided they 
are evoked at the same time" (March (1994), p. 200). 
Third, multiple (and possibly conflicting) believes, goals, identities are likely to entail 
systematic decision inconsistencies, while learning and adaptation in these circumstances may 
well path-dependently strengthen these inconsistencies themselves (March (1988a) and 
(1994)). 
All this applies, even more so, in presence of multiple objectives of individual organisational 
members and of the organisation as a whole. (A related and more detailed discussion is in 
Dosi (1 995a)). 
Rules, organisational routines and competencies. 
More generally, the issue of organisational learning involves the understanding of the 
17 processes by which organisational rules and action patterns change over time. Here, the 
16 In economics, empirical studies of preference formation were a lively field of investigation in the 50's and 
60's (cf. Katona (1951), and (1968)) but were pushed aside by a new generation of believers in expected utility 
theory. Among the few contemporary discussions and formal models dealing with these issues in economics 
cf. March (1988), Akerlof and Dickens (1982), Kuran (1991), Brock and Durlauf (1995)). 
I7 Note that the two might not correspond at all, if by "rules" one means the explicitly stated operating 
procedures of organisation, and "action patterns" are what actually members of the organisation do ... 
relevant evidence coming from organisational studies - albeit far from clean and unequivocal 
- points at organisations as rather inertial behavioural entities which nonetheless are able to 
(path-dependently) change either under the pressures of external adversities and internal 
conflicts (cf. within an immense literature March and Simon (1958), March (1988a), Nelson 
and Winter (1982), Levinthal (1996b) and (1996a)). A particularly important analytical task, 
in this respect, concerns the identification of the nature of organisational routines (i.e. 
recurring, often complex, rather automatic, action patterns, set in an organisational context) 
and their changes : in our view, the discovery, establishment and modifications of routines are 
indeed an essential part of organisational learning ... (On all these issues, cf. Cohen et al. 
(1995)). Routines, in this perspective, store and reproduce a good deal of the problem-solving 
competencies of the organisation and, together, its acquired patterns of governance of 
potentially conflicting interests among its members (Nelson and Winter (1982), Coriat and 
Dosi (1  994)). 
Toward an "evolutionarv" view of agency and learning ? 
There are deep linkages among the findings, conjectures, "stylised facts" that we have 
telegraphically mentioned so far. In fact, we would dare to suggest that they may eventually 
fit well together in an "evolutionary" view of agency and learning, still to come, of which, 
however, one begins to appreciate some basic features Is. 
As we see it, such a view is going to embody the following "building blocks" namely 
Cognitive foundations focused on the dynamics of categories and mental models ; 
Heuristics as quite general processes for decision and learning ; 
Context-dependence, and, relatedly, social embeddedness of both interpretative models and 
decision rules ; 
Endogeneity of (possibly inconsistent) goals and preferences ; 
Organisations as behavioural entities in their own right (whose persistence and whose 
learning patterns certainly depend also on what the members of the organisation do and learn, 
but cannot at all be reduced to the latter) l 9  ; 
Processes of learning, adaptation and discovery apt to (imperfectly) guide representations and 
behaviours also (or primarily ?) in ever-changing environments (so that, even if "you cannot 
bathe twice in the same river", one still tries to develop some robust representations of the 
river itself and some swimming heuristics...). 
It is easy to understand the fundamental departures that this view entails vis-a-vis the 
canonical decision-theoretic one. 
First, it abandons any "small world" assumption : in fact it is centred on a sort of open world 
postulate (one tries to make sense and survive in a world where there are many more things 
18 We call it an "evolutionary view" because it is consistent with the evolutionary research programme as it is 
emerging in economics. Similar views, defined from the perspective of other disciplines, might well take 
different labels. For example, what we label here as "evolutionary" highly overlaps with the research 
programmes on "adaptive learning" and "mental models" in cognitive psychology and artificial sciences .... 
See also below. 
19 In fact, in Dosi (1995a), we push the argument further and suggest that, for many purposes, institutions rather 
than individual "rationality" and preferences ought to be considered as the primitives of the analysis. 
between heaven and earth than in anybody's philosophy ... and, thus, one has always to face 
surprises.. .). 
The clear down-side of this perspective is that, in practice and in principle, neither the agents 
we want to describe nor the theorist (if not a God with an infinitely accurate knowledge of all 
possible histories 20) might be able even to define what is a "rational" decision procedure. The 
experimental evidence recalled above suggests indeed that most of us depart from it also 
when such procedures exist and are rather simple : but, to repeat, these "biases" might be 
precious symptoms of the ways we develop tentatively robust cognitive categories, search 
heuristics and decision rules in environments intrinsically characterised by knowledge-gaps 
and problem-solving gaps. The up-side is that one is also able to recombine cognitive 
categories in unlikely, highly conjectural, thought experiments and, paraphrasing March et al. 
(1991), "learn from samples of one or fewer"!! 
Second, the evolutionary view, as we see it, is not committed to any procedural consistency : 
rather than blackboxing the algorithms for cognition and action, it considers the 
understanding of their mistake-ridden development as a crucial analytical task. 
Third, it implicitly acknowledges the failure - as a general descriptive theory - of the 
axiomatic route and undertakes the less elegant path of a constructive theory, almost 
inevitably tinted by phenomenological specifications and restrictions. 
The challenges and enormous difficulties involved in this research programme on the 
"evolutionary micro-foundations" of socio-economic change should be quite obvious to every 
reader. And these difficulties are compounded by the too frequent lack of robust taxonomies, 
models and generalisable "process stories" from the social disciplines where one should find 
them (e.g. psychology, sociology, etc.). In fact, in an ideal perspective, an economist with 
evolutionary/institutionalist inclinations ought to be able to get there some "level zero" first 
approximation properties - concerning e.g. cognition, social adaptation, collective learning, 
etc. - in order to build his microeconomic assumptions 2 ' .  Unfortunately this too is rarely the 
case. Worse still, one has witnessed significant inroads of the canonical decision-theoretic 
axiomatics into the soft belly of many other social sciences (So that one finds child bearing, 
voting behaviours, drug addiction and, soon to come, infibulation as the equilibrium results of 
forward-looking rational choices ...) 22. 
20 Note that this condition on infinitely perfect knowledge does not only apply to the case of genuinely 
evolutionary worlds: it holds also in all environments whose basic laws of motion are given and understood but 
exhibit non-linearities and sensitive dependence on initial conditions - such as chaotic dynamics. (A few more 
remarks are in Dosi and Metcalfe (1991) and the references there in). 
2 1 A bit like, say, the relationship between physics and chemistry - whereby quantum physics provides, so to 
speak, the "microfoundations" of chemical laws - or, probably more pertinent, the relationship between 
chemistry and biology: while it is impossible to derive the notion of what a cow is just from the laws of 
chemistry, at the very least, the description of a cow should be consistent with the latter, and, at best, they 
ought to provide "level zero" bricks in a constructive theory of cows' development (For a fascinating 
discussion of generative processes of different levels of biological organisation, with some possible bearings 
on the issues of our concern here, cf. Fontana and Buss (1994)). 
22 It is impossible to discuss here the reasons for this phenomenon, which have to do, together with the 
incumbent epistemological looseness of those disciplines; the apparent rigour, parsimoniousness-on- 
assumptions and generality of "economic imperialism" (...going back again to the strength of being rigorously 
wrong...); and, last but not least, a social zeifgeisf which makes today "intuitively obvious" an account of 
behaviours in terms of utility maximisation as it was grace/temptation/Divine Providence up to three centuries 
ago ... (On the latter, Hirschman (1965) presents a broad fresco on modem cultural history which helps in 
Come as it may, the evolutionary research programme on agency and learning in economics 
cannot sit as a sheer user of "stylised facts" and workable generalisations from other 
disciplines. Rather, it seems to us, it has become urgent to pose to the practitioners of other 
disciplines the backlog of puzzling questions that one faces when dealing with the micro- 
foundations of evolutionary processes, and possibly acquire also some of their investigative 
skills 23. 
Well short of any comprehensive synthesis, it is useful to start, more modestly, from some 
basic taxonomical exercises. 
4. Learning Processes: Some Taxonomies and Appreciative 
Theories 
It is tautological that learning has a precondition in knowing less than one notionally could. 
And, of course, the simplest representation of a learning process - familiar from anyone's 
economic training - in terms of refinements of information partitions ; or updating of 
probability distributions ; or estimations of parameters of some model ; or statistically 
coherent comparisons among competing models ... 
However, if one accepts the view of cognition and problem-solving sketched above, one 
needs also to open up the "procedural black-box" and map different learning procedures into 
diverse types of problems and learning contexts. Let us consider them from a few, 
complementary, perspectives. 
Substantive and procedural uncertainty. 
One angle from which to look at learning processes focuses on the levels of cognitive and 
problem-solving complexity and its causes. 
It is useful to distinguish between two different, albeit interrelated, sets of causes that make 
problems "hard", and that match our earlier distinction between knowledge-gaps and 
problem-solving gaps. In general, knowledge gaps arise from the lack of isomorphism 
between the environment and the agent's model of it. This is what we call in Dosi and Egidi 
(1991), paraphrasing H. Simon, substantive uncertainty. In turn, one may further distinguish 
between weak uncertainty (i.e. probabilisable risk) and strong uncertainty, involving genuine 
ignorance and intrinsic inadequacy of the mental models of the agents to fully capture the 
structure of the environment. 
Conversely, problem-solving gaps entail different degrees of procedural uncertainty, with or 
without substantive uncertainty. (An impressionistic taxonomy is presented in figure 1) . The 
distinction is clear, for example, with reference to puzzles like the Rubik cube. Here the 
putting Gary Becker and disciples into perspective ...; nearer to the disciplinary topics of this paper, cf. 
Hodgson (1988); more specifically, on the current interchanges between economic and sociology, see Baron 
and Hannan (1994); a less concise outline of the views on these themes of one of the authors is in Dosi 
(1995a)). 
23 The list of such questions is obviously very long: it includes e.g. the possible invariance in individual and 
organisational learning processes, the nature and evolution of "rules" for both cognition and action, better 
specifications of the social embeddedness of individual behaviours, and many others ... 
Regarding the interdisciplinary efforts we have in mind, the works by Cohen and Bacdayan (1994) and Egidi 
(1996) on routines and learning are good examples. 
structure of the problem is rather simple, ones the rules are known, and there is no substantive 
uncertainty : rather, solving the problem itself is the difficult task, involving relatively 
complex skills of sub-problem decomposition and sophisticated logical skills (Dosi and Egidi 
(1991)). Similar considerations apply to activities like theorem-proving and also, nearer to the 
economist's concerns, to many tasks associated with technological innovation such as the 
design and implementation of new products and processes. 
The distinction helps also illuminating the somewhat different nature of the related learning 
processes. In the case of procedural uncertainty they concern primarily the development of 
problem-solving skills and heuristics. 
Conversely when the latter can be reduced to rather simple and well understood algorithms, 
but uncertainty is primarily substantive, learning regards essentially the representation and 
framing of the problem 24. 
Learning and the "logic of ap~ropriateness". 
We have already mentioned that in most circumstances knowledge-gaps and problem-solving 
gaps are often related. 
24 Incidentally note that the standard decision theoretic tool kit handles essentially substantive uncertainty (in its 
"weak form) but is much less apt to deal with learning in the space of problem-solving procedures. 
Fig. 1. Substantive and procedural uncertainty : a taxonomy of problems 
First of all, they are likely to appear together in evolutionary environments : it is 
straightforward that the continuous possibility of arrival of innovations implies "strong" 
substantive uncertainty, but, relatedly, this implies a symmetric procedural uncertainty (how 
can I cope with a changed environment ? How can I, myself, innovate?). 
Moreover, the psychological evidence shows, the knowledge of the "structure" of the problem 
and problem-solving capabilities strongly influence each other : the way we perceive the 
structure of the problem largely depends on the kind of problem-solving skills we possess 
and, conversely, the problem-solving skills we develop are shaped by the ways we frame the 
problem (A germane discussion of the intertwining between a particular representation and a 
particular expertise is in Lane et al. (1996)). 
Substantive uncertainty 
Procedural uncertainty 
Certainty 
The phenomenon hint at a more general property of decision making and learning which J. 
March has named the logic of appropriateness. As opposed to the archetypical decision 
process based on the evaluation of alternatives in terms consequences for utilities (i.e. the 
"logic of consequences") in the appropriateness logic, 
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"individuals and organisations fulfill identities, they follow rules or procedures that they see as 
appropriate to the situation ...[ while] neither preferences as they are normally conceived nor 
expectations of future consequences enter directly into the calculus ... 
with finite 
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trees 
with 
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Decision makers are imagined to ask (explicitly or implicitly) three questions : 
"Weak" uncertainty 
(risk) 
lotteries and most 
other set-ups 
considered by 
standard theory of 
decision under 
uncertainty 
quite a few game- 
theoretic problems ; 
relatively simple 
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in stationary 
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non-recursively 
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1 - The question of recognition : what kind of situation is this ? 
"Strong" uncertainty 
adaptation and 
innovation in 
evolutionary 
environment 
2 - The question of identity : what kind of person am I ? 
Or what kind of organisation is this ? 
3 - The question of rules: what does a person such as I, or an organisation such as this, do in a 
situation such as this ? (March (1994), pp. 57-8). 
Note that under the logic of appropriateness, so defined, an important part of learning is about 
the understanding and implementation of the appropriate rules, and, in a broader perspective 
entails the co-evolution if identities, representations and rules. 
It is our believe that indeed the "logic of appropriateness" informs a good deal of individual 
and organisational behaviours, and, to anticipate one of our conclusions, an urgent task ahead 
is to formally incorporate it into evolutionary theorising. 
Information, knowledge and learning. 25 
Many contributors to contemporary evolutionary theory have drawn a fundamental distinction 
between information and knowledge. The former entails well stated and codified propositions 
about (i) states-of-the world (e.g. "it is raining"...), (ii) properties of nature (e.g. "...A causes 
B...")) ; (iii) identities of the other agents ("I know Mr. X and he is a crook...") and (iv) 
26 
explicit algorithms on how to do things . Conversely, knowledge, in the definition we 
propose here, includes a) cognitive categories ; b) codes of interpretation of the information 
itself ; c) tacit skills, and d) search and problem-solving heuristics irreducible to well defined 
algorithms. 
So, for example, the few hundred pages of demonstration of the last Fermat theorem would 
come under the heading of "information". Having said that, only some dozen mathematicians 
in the world will have adequate knowledge to understand and evaluate it. On the other hand, a 
chimpanzee, facing those same pages of information might just feel like eating them, and the 
vast majority of human beings would fall somewhere in between these two extremes ... 
Similarly a manual on "how to produce microprocessors" is "information", while knowledge 
concerns the pre-existing ability of the reader to understand and implement the instructions 
contained therein. Moreover, in this definition, knowledge includes tacit and rather automatic 
skills like operating a particular machine or correctly driving a car to overtake another one 
(without stopping first in order to solve the appropriate system of differential equations ! !). 
Finally, it includes "visions" and ill-defined rules of search, like those involved in most 
activities of scientific discovery, and in technological and organisational innovation (e.g. 
proving a new theorem, designing a new kind of car, figuring out the behavioural patterns of a 
new kind of crook that appeared on the financial market...). 
In this definition, knowledge is to varying degrees tacit, at the very least in the sense that the 
agent itself, and even a very sophisticated observer, would find it very hard to explicitly state 
the sequence of procedures by which information is coded, behavioural patterns are formed, 
problems are solved, etc. In fact, as Winter (1987) suggests varying degrees of tacitness 
together with other dimensions (see figure 2 below) provide a sort of interpretative grid by 
which to classify different types of knowledge. 
Fig. 2. Taxonomic Dimensions of Knowledge Assets (from Winter (1987), p.170) 
25 This paragraph is largely drawn from Dosi (1995b). 
26 These four sets correspond quite closely to the codified aspects of Lundvall's taxonomy, distinguishing know- 
what, know-why, know-who and know-how (Lundvall(1995)). 
Not teachable ----------------Teachable 
Not articulated -------------------Articulated 
Not observable in use ----------------- Observable in use 
Complex ....................... Simple 
An element of a system ---------------- Independent 
In this perspective, learning has three inter-related meanings. 
First, rather obviously, it might involve, as in the conventional view, the acquisition of more 
information (conditional on the ability of correctly interpreting it). 
Second, it entails various forms of augmentation of knowledge stricto sensu (which might 
well be independent from any arrival of new pieces of information). 
Third, it might concern the articulation and codification of previously tacit knowledge 
(learning here involves so to speak "knowing better what you know"). 
In particular, this third aspect has recently drawn a lively debate concerning whether new 
information technologies accelerate the pace of codification and fundamentally upset the 
relative importance in contemporary economies between "information" and "tacit knowledge" 
(for different views on this point, cf. e.g. Foray and Lundvall (1996) and several 
contributions therein, Hicks (1995), Pavitt(1992)). 
Appreciative theories of knowledge accumulation and innovation. 
The levels of generality 'of most of what said so far - on decision, knowledge, learning 
processes, etc. - place the argument very near major foundational issues on cognition and 
agency in evolutionary environments. However, a good deal of (highly complementary) 
efforts by evolutionary-inclined scholars has been recently devoted to empirically grounded 
"appreciative" theories, to use the definition of Nelson and Winter (1982), in particular in the 
fields of technological and organisational learning. As a result - within the broad field of the 
"economics of innovation" - one knows much more as compared to, say, thirty years ago 
about the variety of processes by which knowledge is augmented and diffused in the economy 
(major contributions in this area include those of Christopher Freeman (cf. Freeman (1982) 
and (1994)), Nathan Rosenberg (cf. Rosenberg (1976), (1982) and (1994)), Keith Pavitt (cf. 
Pavitt(1984)), Richard Nelson (cf. Nelson (1987) and (1993)), Paul David (cf. David (1975) 
and (1985)) and others). 
A first broad property (probably not surprising for non-economists, but with far reaching 
analytical implications) is the diversity of learning modes and sources of knowledge across 
technologies and across sectors. For example, in some activities knowledge is accumulated 
primarily via informal mechanisms of learning-by-doing and learning-by-interacting with 
customers, suppliers, etc. In others, it involves much more formalised activities of search 
(such as those undertaken in R&D labs). In some fields, knowledge is mostly generated 
internally and specific to particular applications. In others it draws much more directly upon 
academic research and scientific advances. Recent research suggests that this diversity of 
learning modes may be a major determinant of the diverse patterns of evolution in industrial 
structures (e.g. in terms of distribution of firm sizes, natality and mortality of firms, corporate 
diversification). 
An important step in the understanding of the "anatomy" of contemporary systems of 
production and knowledge accumulation has involved taxonomic exercises (e.g. Pavitt 
(1984)) trying to map families of technologies and sectors according to their sources of 
innovative knowledge and their typical innovative procedures. 
At the same time, one has tried to identify possible invariance which holds across 
technologies, in the patterns of learning (notions like "technological paradigms", "regimes" 
and "technological trajectories" belong to this domain of analysis), and descriptive indicators 
for these same patterns (e.g. Dosi (1984)). Relatedly, variables like the levels of "innovative 
opportunity" associated to each technological paradigm, the degrees of "cumulativeness" 
displayed by technical advances, etc. have turned out to be quite useful in interpreting the 
determinants of the particular "trajectories" of innovation that one observes (Malerba and 
Orsenigo ( 1996)). 
Second, in modern economies, firms are major, albeit by no means unique, repositories of 
knowledge. Individual organisations embody specific ways of solving problems that are often 
very difficult to replicate in other organisations or even within the organisation itself. In turn, 
organisational knowledge as mentioned earlier is stored to a good extent into the operating 
procedures ("the routines") and the higher level rules (concerning e.g. "what to do when 
something goes wrong", or "how to change lower level routines") that firms enact while 
handling their problem-solving tasks in the domains of production, research, marketing, etc. 
Dynamically, technological knowledge is modified and augmented partly within individual 
firms, and partly through the interaction with other firms (competitors, users, suppliers, etc.) 
and other institutions (universities, technical societies, etc.). In these domains, growing 
literature on organisational capabilities and competencies has begun to explore the links 
between specific ensembles of organisational routines, types of organisational knowledge and 
corporate strategies (cf. Teece and Pisano (1994) introducing a special issue of Industrial and 
Coruorate Change on these topics ; Lundvall (1996), Winter (1987) and (1988), Montgomery 
(1985) and also the somewhat more theoretical considerations in Dosi and Marengo (1994)). 
Third, building upon the foregoing properties of the nature of technological learning and of 
the ways organisations incorporate knowledge, a few scholars have started to explore an 
explicit co-evolutionary view, whereby the accumulation of technological knowledge is 
shaped and constrained by the nature of the organisations and institutions where this 
knowledge demand and possibly trigger changes in corporate organisations and broader 
institutions Nelson (1983), Kogut (1993), Coriat and Dosi (199%)). 
From appreciative theories to formal models. 
To what extent have formal theories been able to capture the foregoing "stylised facts", 
taxonomies and historically-grounded generalisations on collective learning ? 
In order to offer some answers, let us rephrase the earlier taxonomic intuitions into a language 
nearer to possible modelling translations. 
Recall the canonical steps of decision processes mentioned at the beginning of this work (i.e. 
representation ; judgement ; choice ; action ; consequences). When accounting for learning, 
each of these steps define some state-space of exploration. Accordingly, different classes of 
learning models can be distinguished with respect to the dimensions of the state space in 
which learning occurs. 
Objects and state-spaces of learning processes. 
What is learning about ? 
There are basically four classes of objects of learning : a) the "states-of-the-world" (as in 
games against nature) ; b) other agents' behaviours (as in strategic games) ; c) how to solve 
problems (where the object of learning is not forecasting but designing algorithms) ; and d) 
one's own preferences (i.e. agents learn, so to speak, about their own characteristics and 
identity). 
Note, first, that a full fledged evolutionary model (yet to come) ought to be able to account 
for all four classes, and, even better, generate empirically testable conjectures on the coupled 
dynamics among the different learning processes. Second, it might well be that different 
objects of learning might imply also different mechanisms of search and learning (as far as 
we know, no robust generalisation appears to be available on this issue : yet another question 
that ought to be sorted out together with cognitive psychologists, sociologists, etc ...). a) This 
categorisation of learning objects partially maps into different formal representation of the 
dimensions of the state-space in which learning is generally assumed to occur, namely : the 
space of representations or models of the world, b) the space of parameters within agiven 
model, c) the space of actions and d) the space of realised performance outcomes ". 
In the former case, learning is modelled as a search for better representations of the 
environment in which the agent is operating. Agents are supposed to hold models of the 
environment either explicitly (as, within psychology and artificial sciences, in rule-based 
models) or implicitly (as in connectionist models) and learning is defined as a structural 
modification (and not just the tuning of parameters) of the models themselves. Note that in 
the expression "better representation", better can have two very different meanings : it can 
either indicate better performing models, that is yielding more effective action, or more 
knowledgeable models, that is producing better predictions of the state of the environment. In 
the case where "better" means "better performing", the agent is assumed to adjust behaviours 
according only to the payoffs he receives, and a completely wrong representation which by 
chance produces effective action in relation to the actually experienced states of the world has 
to be preferred to an "almost" correct representation which, though being "close" to the real 
model, produces less effective actions in some of the same states of the world. But a similar 
question arises also when "better" means "better predicting", both because, in a similar 
fashion, bad representations which produce good predictions are preferred to good 
representations which produce worse prediction, and also because the very perception of what 
is a good prediction depends on the model itself: for instance a change in the state of the 
world form s, to sJ might not be perceived as such by the agent whose information partition 
has s, and sJ in the same equivalence class, and, thus, the agent is led to think that his model 
has not decreased his predictive power (see also below). 
Learning in the space of parameters assumes that the model of the world is given in its 
functional structure and is equal or at least isomorphic to the "real" one and learning is just a 
refinement of the estimation of some unknown parameters. A typical example is Bayesian 
learning, where the learning agent updates his probability estimates within a given and 
immutable set of categories which constitute a partition of the real world (whatever that 
means). 
Learning in the space of actions assumes instead that either the representation is constant or 
that it does not exist at all. As we shall see, this is typically the case of simple stimulus- 
response models of learning and most of the evolutionary games models, where the learning 
is simply modelled as a selection process in the space of alternative actions. 
27 The mapping with the above classification is imprecise also in the sense that one leaves out, as most of the 
formal literature does, endogenous changes in goals and preferences. 
Finally, learning can be modelled as a dynamic process in the space of realised performance 
outcomes, whereby the actual process of learning is not modelled at all but the model 
considers only its results in terms of dynamics in the space of some performance parameters. 
Typical examples can be found in models of technological learning, where learning is a 
stochastic process in the space of productivity coefficients. 
It is clear that a) implies b) implies c) implies d) : learning in the space of representations 
involves also the possibility of parameter estimates within a given structural form, a selection 
process among possible actions 28, and of course results into some movement in the space of 
performance outcome. Thus modelling strategies which remain at the higher level of 
description and do not explicitly address the "deeper" cognitive search and behavioural 
adaptation either assume that the latter has been "solved" (for instance the "right" information 
partition has been found) or, acknowledging the relevance of those lower levels, they only 
model, more parsimoniously, a "reduced form". 
Domains and constraints of learning processes 
Given the underlying object of learning or, more formally, the dimensions of state space of 
learning dynamics, what constraints does one assume on the domains of learning processes 
themselves ? 
Here the most important distinction is between searchladaptation over a fixed menu of 
possibilities which are all accessible from the start to all agents vs. an open-ended dynamics 
where the discovery of genuine novelties is always possible. As we shall illustrate below, this 
distinction marks an important cleavage between alternative modelling frameworks. 
If all the notional elements of the learning set are known from the start, agents might be 
assumed to attach probabilities to each of them and to their consequences, thus possibly using 
some inferential procedure to adjust their behaviours. (Here the basic paradigm is the 
Bayesian model). Or, often to the same effects, the sheer availability of all possible 
behaviours in population, given a stationary environment, establishes an environmental 
landscape in which it might be too difficult to define the adaptation drive at work and the 
related equilibria. (The philosophy of evolutionary games' is near to this spirit). Conversely, 
whenever novelties happen to persistently appear, probability updating are likely to turn out 
to be a rather clumsy learning procedure, since the state-space can no longer be usefully 
partitioned, due to the emergence of surprises and unforeseen (indeed, unforeseeable) 
events29. 
And, rather symmetrically, in population-based adaptive frameworks, the systematic 
appearance of novelties implies also an ever-expanding payoff matrix, continuously deformed 
by the interaction with new events and strategies 30. 
Mechanisms of learning. 
28 Note that actions might be considered part of the representation, as it is the case, for instance, when 
representations are modelled as condition-action rules. 
29 It is true that probabilistic decision making allows for the introduction of a complement-to-the-universe 
category (i.e. "all other events") in the information partition in order to close it, but in presence of genuine 
novelty (that is, "strong" substantive uncertainty, as defined above), i t  is unreasonably farfetched to assume 
that a probability could be attached to an unbounded set of events not even conceivable for the decision- 
maker. In the debate between the advocates of non-probabilistic approaches to uncertainty vs. supporters of the 
probability paradigm, see also Dubois and Prade (1988) and the references therein. 
30 In biological models, this corresponds to endogenous landscapes with no ex-ante definable fitness maxima . 
The very notion of learning, also in the common language, imply a sort of reference 
yardstick, measuring some "improvement", however defined, in terms of e.g. cognition, 
forecasting abilities, collectively assessed performances, inwardly evaluated utilities, etc. 
Assume, in a first approximation, that those same criteria are what drive the learning process. 
Even then, one may well find quite different mechanisms at work (and correspondingly 
different formal "laws of motion"). For example, "learning" could be simply a shorthand 
characterisation of a population-level selection mechanism involving differential reproduction 
of entities (e.g., in economics, business firms) carrying different behavioural, organisational, 
or technological traits. Or, it may mean an adaptation process driven by stimulus-response 
adjustments, without any explicit underlying cognitive process. Or, again, it could be based 
on agent-specific mechanisms involving expectations, internal involvement of credit, etc. 
While in the simplest specifications of the object of learning the three types of dynamics may 
well turn out to be (asymptotically) equivalent, they might make indeed a major difference, in 
terms of finite-time properties even for simple learning processes, and, a fortiori, in terms of 
long-term outcomes of discovery and adaptation in more complex evolutionary environments. 
With respect to the modelling frameworks, at one extreme, stimulus-response adaptation 
(with or without environmental selection) implies agents without any explicit "reasoning", 
memory or inferential algorithms leading from the outcomes of their actions to the revision of 
their future decision rules. At another extreme, agents may be modelled as forward-looking 
users of the best available information (at least in terms of what their bounded competencies 
allow). In some peculiarly simple circumstances, the two apparently opposite mechanisms of 
learning can be shown to lead to identical limit outcomes (...which look too often like all 
those cases whereby electrical shocks to rats leads them to converge to those equilibrium 
behaviours predicted by rational-expectation rats facing the same environment ...) 3' .  
However, in most other set-ups, the specification of the mechanisms of learning does make a 
difference : this is an area where unfortunately, to our knowledge, one does not have yet 
empirically robust generalisations which can be easily translated into formal modelling 
assumptions. 
On the grounds of the foregoing distinctions, fig. 3 presents an impressionistic classification 
of examples of each genre in the current modelling literature. These differences in learning 
processes can also be formally accounted as variations and restrictions on the grounds of a 
unified basic representation. This is what we shall attempt to do in the next section. 
" ~ n d  this is indeed the amusing behavioural support that Lucas (1986) suggests for the rational expectation 
hypothesis. 
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5. A Basic Model and Various Specifications 
Let us consider a standard decision problem whereby an agent faces an environment which 
can be in one out of an enumerable set of elementary outcomes : 
In most relevant economic problems, the agent will not know the whole set of states of the 
world S (and even less so their casual links), but he will possess only an imprecise and partial 
representation thereof : 
0' = {I?; ,I?; , . .  ,I?; ,. where 19,' c S and 0' c 2S 
Each i3j includes all the states-of-the-world which the agent considers as possible, or cannot 
discriminate, when one or more elementary outcomes contained in i3j occur (note that in most 
economic models it is assumed that 0' = S - meaning that the agent "knows" the structure of 
the world or, at least, 0 is assumed to be a partition of S). Assuming instead that more 
generally O c 2 s  we have a representation which can account for : 
complete ignorance : 
29; = S for every i = 1,2 .... n 
partial ignorance of some states of the world, if 
uiq  cs 
i.e. the agent may be "surprised" by some events which he did not even think of. 
hierarchies of hypotheses and/or partially overlapping hypotheses : 
6i c 6. or, more generally, 
J 
Bi n 6 .  # 0 and Bi # 6 .  
J J 
systematic mistakes, when an outcome is believed to occur when it does not, and is not 
thought to be possible when it actually does occur. 
Let then assume that the agent is notionally endowed with an enumerable set of possible 
actions : 
At any point in time, the agents holds a finite behavioural repertoire constructed from the 
basic "atomic" actions contained in A, subject to revision, modification and recombination. 
Note that in general one ought to allow the agent to know only a subset of all notional 
repertoire derivable from A. Let us call the known repertoire at time t : 
5' ={{:,{; ,....., 6; ,.... } where {,! L A  andE' ~2 A 
It must be pointed out that 0' and 5' do not only reflect the agent's sharpness at interpreting 
the information coming from the environment, by defining how sharp or coarse are his 
categories (information processing capabilities, in the standard decision-theoretic jargon), but 
embed also a lot of the "cognitive order" that the agent imposes on the world. 0 ,  in particular, 
contains the variables and categories that the agent perceives as relevant to the representation 
problem in the undifferentiated flow of signals coming from the environment. 
Hence, beyond very simple and special cases, 0' and E  ' entail some sort of grammar 
determining the legal cognitive and behavioural structures that can be notionally generated. 
Genuinely constructive models of cognition and problem-solving ought to tackle the 
processes of search in some functional space of which some 6 ' s  are themselves the outcome. 
So, for example, the proposition "we are in the state Q" is generated through cognitive 
operations attributing a semantic value to the signals received in the environmental state 
interpreted by the agent under 19~. AS we shall see we are unfortunately still very far from the 
fulfilment of this research task (see however Fontana and Buss (1996) for a fascinating 
framework which might possibly be applied also to these problems). 
The set of "perceived" histories at time t contains some finite-length histories of perceived 
states of the world and perceived actions which have occurred up to time t : 
where h; ~0~ x @ ~ + ~ . . . x ~ ' x z ~  x E k +  l . . .  xE' 
We have repeatedly emphasised that a satisfactory understanding of learning processes entails 
an account of cognitive categories and "mental models" which attribute a causal structure (an 
"interpretation") to perceived histories. In this formal setting, an interpretation or model can 
be seen as an algorithm which attribute a causal sense to perceived histories or a subset of 
them. Call such "models" : 
Notice that, first, particular cases include those whereby agents retain only a dissipating 
memory of their representations and actions. Second, a single agent may well hold multiple 
(and contradictory) models at each t. Third, in terms of most current models, notice also that 
a sort of naive "transparency assumption" rules out an interpretation stage (everyone knows 
what really happened ...) A decision rule is a mapping between interpretations, so defined, and 
action repertoires : 
A special case, which is commonly considered in the models discussed below, is when the 
mappings r' define a probability distribution over the set of action repertoires. An agent's 
decision-making capabilities at time t can therefore be represented by the (finite) set of 
decision rules it holds : 
When the agent acts upon the environment, it receives a "response" (or an outcome) out of a 
set P of possible responses: 
However, in general, the agent will only know an imprecise and partial representation of such 
outcomes. Moreover it might well change over time its evaluation criteria (i.e., in standard 
language, its "preferences"). Call pavoffs such evaluations in terms of some desirability 
criterion (being it utility, peace of mind, problem-solving achievement, morality, pleasure and 
pain, minimum regret, etc.) : 
Hence, let us define a payoff function as : 
On the grounds of this very general sketch of a decision-making model, we can re-examine 
the different loci of learning discussed earlier in a more qualitative fashion. However, it 
might be useful to begin with some extreme examples in order to flag some basic points of 
this exercise. First, note that the most familiar economic models of decision-making assume 
that : 
0 ' s  are strictly partitions of S ; 
there is a known and, often, trivial set of action repertoires Z and, hence, the distinction 
between Z and A is redundant (witness the fact that economists and decision theorists are 
generally more comfortable in dealing with metaphors such as lotteries, where the very action 
- putting a finger on the object of the set - could be performed by any chimpanzee, rather than 
building computers, proving theorems, etc.) ; 
"interpretations" are always identical to "true" stories, and, again, the <D algorithm is 
redundant ; 
evaluation criteria on outcomes are time-invariant so that one can innocently assume also 
invariant payoff functions which drive learning. 
All in all, under this scenario, some well specified dynamics on learning about the mapping 
S x A + R turns out to be everything which one needs to know. 
Second, at the opposite extreme, a caricatural "sociological" might well claim that : 
as a first approximation, Z's are invariant in t (i.e. "you do what you are supposed to do..") ; 
outcomes are always "good" (Mr. Pangloss' rule : we live in the best of possible worlds. For 
simplicity, U' is always in the neighbourhood of some U , irrespectively of p' :"like what you 
get no matter what...") ; 
learning is basically about the endogenous development of representations, interpretations and 
"utilities" which fulfil the invariance in the Z's and U's. 
No doubt that the former caricatural model has been taken formally more seriously than the 
latter. However, as a first descriptive approximation, the authors of this essay, tend to bet on 
the worth of the latter. 
Learning about the states of the world32. 
This obviously implies changing the representation O'. Moreover, these changing 
representations could simply involve search in the parameter space or, more fundamentally, 
the very structure of the model of the world itself. 
Suppose for instance that S is governed by a stochastic process. The agent might know which 
kind of stochastic process generates the sequence of states of the world - e.g., for sake of 
illustration, a Markov process - and have only to "learn" the correct estimate of the 
32 Here and throughout we shall hint at some basic and proximate structure of a few models, with inevitable 
gross approximations on both the detailed formalisms and assumption refinements. Apologies to 
misinterpreted authors are due. 
parameters - e.g. Markov transition probabilities -. Or he might ignore the nature of the 
stochastic process itself or even that there is a stochastic process at all 33. 
Note also that the possibility for the decision maker to learn about the stochastic process in S 
depends on the representation O' he holds : only if the latter discriminates among the states in 
t the sequence s1,s2, ...., s ,...in separate categories will the agent have a chance to correctly learn 
the underlying stochastic process . But the converse might also be true : having chunks of 
states held together might make it easier to find deterministic patterns out of what might look 
like a random sequence. 
The nature and degree of uncertainty about the stochastic process depends also on the general 
causal structure of the environment. In particular, we can distinguish among : 
interactions with nature without feed-back ; 
interactions with nature with feed-back ; 
multi-agent strategic interactions (including standard game-theoretic ones).34 
A fundamental case for our purposes arises when the actions of the agent himself generate 
new states of the world which did not exist in the original notional set S. Innovative 
behaviours are a typical case to the point : new environmental opportunities are endogenously 
created, thus making also any sharp distinction between exploration over S and exploration 
over A only a first cut approximation3'. As argued in Dosi and Egidi (1991), it might well be 
the case that in such innovative environment a) the set S loses the enumerability property, and 
b) even an agent who has a perfect knowledge of S to start with will be bound to revise his 
representation. 
Learning about the actions space (changing the repertoires St) .  
The set of action repertoires Z' can be modified through time, reflecting the "technology" of 
the agent. New actions can be discovered which were not in the agent's repertoire before, or 
existing actions can be combined in new ways : both circumstances are isomorphic to the 
search in the problem-solving space (and the related procedural uncertainty) discussed 
earlier.. 
Learning about the payoff function (changing the mapping 7~' ) .  
If the agent does not know S and A but holds only imprecise and partial representations 
thereof, a fortiori he will have an imprecise and partial knowledge of how the payoff 
function, as earlier defined, maps into "objective" outcomes. It is worth pointing out that 
most learning algorithms model learning as a modification of representation of the world and 
33 There exists ample experimental evidence that probability matching, which amounts to ignoring that data 
are generated by a stochastic process, is a typical judgmental bias which appears even in the behaviour of 
expert decision makers. 
34 A similar distinction is made in Marimon (1995). 
35 This notwithstanding, we do maintain that it is a useful first approximation, and in that we take issues with 
the radical proponent of "social constructivism" (which in the formal framework presented here would also 
mean collapsing representations into actions). Putting it into a rather caricatural way, while we claim that a 
world with the atomic bomb entails a set of events different (and greater) than a world without it, we also 
maintain that any exploration in the problem solving space, no matter how well "socially constructed" will 
hardly allow violation of the law of gravitation or time-reversibility of actions. Several issues concerning the 
"social construction" of technological knowledge are discussed in Rip et al. (1995). From a different angle, 
collective learning processes are discussed in Lane et al. (1995). 
action repertoires where the learning agent adaptively develops quasi-pavoff-equivalent 
categories of events and actions, i.e. categories which tend to reflect the regularities of the 
payoff function, rather than the regularities of the underlying sets of states and actions. Thus, 
under some conditions, adaptive learning algorithms tend to produce a better knowledge of 
the payoff function than of the sets S and A. 
Note also that endogenous preferences cum reduction of cognitive dissonance etc. (see above) 
involve a dynamics in both n' and 0' conditional on past realisations (something which one 
hardly finds in any current model, evolutionary or not). 
Learning about the decision rules (changing the set of rules 3'). 
A basic (and again largely unresolved) issue concerns the dimension of the state space of rule 
search. In the spirit of the foregoing discussion, it ought to concern some (metaphoric) 
representation, internal to the agent, of the mappings on 0' x Z '  x  x'. However, the 
generality of existing models are stuck to a much simpler view (a reduced form ? Or, rather, a 
trivialisation ?) with a fixed menu of rules to begin with and three, possibly overlapping, 
learning mechanisms, namely : first, some selection mechanism which modifies the weights 
attributed to each rule and therefore its probability of being selected for action ; second, 
mechanisms for modifying the domain of applicability of a rule, that is the subset of the set of 
perceived histories which fire the rule ; and, third (often not easily distinguishable from the 
above), a process for generating new rules which previously did not exist, possibly by 
modifying or recombining in some way already existing ones. 
What kind of formal modelling and results does one currently find ? In the rest of this section 
we will discuss briefly some of the main classes of models. Departing from a sketch of the 
classical Bayesian leaning models, we will then consider a class of models which are 
evolutionary in the sense that they explicitly take on board learning and adjustment dynamics 
of some kind, although they tackle primarily adaptation rather than evolution strict0 sensu : 
i.e. they still keep some "small world" assumption on S, A, etc. and moreover generally tend 
to rule out (with some noticeable exceptions) any endogeneity of the environmental (or 
cognitive) landscapes over which representations, actions and decision rules are selected. 
(Most of the work in this field comes under the heading of "evolutionary games"). 
Bayesian Learning : single- and multi-agent without feedback. 
As a starting point, consider Bayesian learning in the single- and multi-agents situation 
without feed-back from the environment. A typical case is based on the assumptions that the 
state of the world is determined by some stochastic process and the agent(s) has to select at 
each time t a proper action. Hence, the agent has to produce an estimate of the stochastic 
process and compute the expected utility of a course of action. A "subjectively rational" agent 
holds a prior distribution p which he updates through a Bayesian rule, by computing a 
posterior distribution after observing the realisations of the stochastic process and the payoff 
received. 
In the multi-agent case (Kalai and Lehrer (1993)), the prior distribution concerns the actions 
of the other players (their "types"). Contrary to the hypotheses which are made in the 
literature on e.g. rationalizable strategies, such a prior distribution does not require 
knowledge of the other agents' payoff matrices, but only of one's own ; however, S and A 
must be common knowledge. 
Bayesian updating processes in this case strongly converge ("strongly merge") if the sequence 
of posterior distributions converge, in the limit, to the real distribution on S (Blackwell and 
Dubins (1962)). But this can happen only if prior distributions attach positive probability to 
all and only the subsets of S which have positive probability for the underlying stochastic 
process. This amounts to postulating perfect ex-ante knowledge of all possible events. Kalai 
and Lehrer (1993) show this result in a nxn game without feed-back, in which they assume 
agents do not have complete knowledge of the space of strategies of the other players, nor do 
they have to share homogeneous priors, but their prior must be "compatible with the truth", 
that is they have to attach positive probability to all and only the events which can occur with 
positive probability (the so-called "grain of truth" condition). 
Moreover Feldman (1991) ha shown that if the set A is non-enumerable, convergence of 
posterior distributions to the true one cannot be guaranteed. 
Stochastic Learning Models. 
Of course, Bayesian learning is highly demanding on the prior knowledge agents are assumed 
to have from the start (a point nowadays acknowledged also by scholars otherwise inclined to 
some "rationalist" axiomatics of learning processes). A much less demanding way, common 
in the contemporary literature, to introduce learning is to suppose some form of selection 
process among a finite set of possible actions. Two modelling strategies are possible in this 
respect : on the one hand, models might assume the existence of a population of agents, each 
identified with one action 36 and consider the learninglselection process taking place entirely 
at the population level. On the other hand, each agent could be modelled by a set of actions, 
with the selection process being a metaphor of its search capabilities (cf. Fudenberg and 
Kreps (1993), Kaniovski and Young (1994)). This distinction goes beyond the interpretation 
of the metaphor itself but - as will shall see - has some substantial consequences on the 
modelling strategy. 
First, consider a face-value interpretation of standard evolutionary games. Indeed, 
evolutionary games assume away any problem of representation, both on states of world and 
on actions, and, so to speak, collapse learning of decision rules into selecting among a set of 
given behavioural repertoires (further assuming that such a selection process is exogenously 
driven by the environment). Agents carry no cognitive capability, but have basically two 
roles : that of carrying the "memory" of the system (e.g. that of being "replicators" of some 
kind) and that of introducing some exploration (via random mutation). 
In one standard formulation, evolutionary game models (cf.. the pioneering work of Maynard 
Smith (1982) and, later, in economics e.g. the work by Friedman (1991) and Kandori, 
Mailath and Rob (1993), Young (1993) and Weibull (1995)) assume that there exists a 
population of N agents and a finite set of actions a,,a z..... ak. If we denote by ni(t) the number 
of agents adopting strategy ai , the basic selection principle states that : 
if and only if nt(ai,s')> nt(aj,s') 
The fundamental selection principle therefore implies that actions which have higher payoff 
are increasingly sampled in the population. It is often (though not always) the case that this 
selection principle takes the special form of replicator dynamics equation, originally 
suggested by biological arguments (cf.. the pioneering work of Maynard Smith (1982) and, 
36 Coherently with the terminology introduced in the basic model, we use the term action rather than the more 
common strategy for this kind of models. 
earlier, Fisher (1930)) but widely used also in economic models - though with less convincing 
arguments l7 
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where n' is the average payoff across the population. Learning is driven by the joint action 
of a selection principle and a variation mechanism, i.e. the constant introduction of search by 
means of random mutation, whereby some agents mutate their strategy with some given 
(small) probability. 
Originally, mutation was conceived as a pointly and isolated phenomenon (cf. Maynard 
Smith (1982)), introduced as a device for studying the evolutionary stability of equilibria. An 
equilibrium was said to be evolutionary stable if, once achieved, it could not be disrupted if a 
small proportion of mutants appeared in the population. More recent developments (cf., for 
instance, Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Foster and Young (1990), Fudenberg and Harris 
(1992)) of stochastic evolutionary games, have incorporated mutation as a continuous 
process : hence the equilibria generally emerge as limit distributions of some dynamic process 
(in some cases, however, ergodicity is lost such as in Fudenberg and Harris (1992) and in 
Kaniovski and Young (1 994)). 
Further developments concern the nature of the selection process in (2). The dynamics can in 
fact be made dependent upon the past history of interactions, as summarised by the relative 
frequencies of actions within the population and/or by the some sample of the past payoffs. 
Along these lines, Young (1993) considers a stochastic version of a replication mechanism 
whereby an action diffuses across the population according to a sample of the payoff obtained 
in the last few periods. Along similar lines, a class of models (see especially Milgrom and 
Roberts (1991) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) and Kaniovski and Young (1994)), 
considers more sophisticated agents, by endowing them with some form of memory which 
keeps track of the consequences of actions and of the other players' replies in the past. 
Learning becomes a process of selection of sequence of actions which are best reply to 
sampled strategies (Kaniovski and Young (1994)) and might induce the emergence of 
"conventions", i.e. stable patterns of behaviour (which are at least locally stable Nash 
equilibria ; Young (1993) shows it in the cases of very simple memory endowments). 
Stochastic nzodels with self-reinforcement. 
In evolutionary games it is customary to assume that actions which have better performed in 
the past tend to diffuse more rapidly across the population of players, while the selection 
mechanism itself is either a replicator equation or is constructed via adaptation driven by 
infinitely frequent interactions among agents at each iteration (as in Kandori et al. (1993)). 
Other kinds of models consider different mechanisms of diffusion, where agents choose an 
action according to some simple algorithm, such as a majority rule (that is, choose the action 
which is adopted by the majority of some observed sample of the population). 
First, if one considers a finite population of players, the number of agents who select action a, 
at time t defines a Markov chain where transition probabilities depend on actual frequencies 
of actions in the population. For instance, assume a population of N individuals and 
37 Many recent models have worked with a more general setting where broader classes of selection rules are 
considered, rather than strict replicator dynamics (cf., for instance, Kandori, Mailalh and Rob (1993), 
Kaniovski and Young (1994)). 
A={a,,a,}. Agent i, who has selected action a, at time t-1, switches at time t to action a, with 
probability : 
where n,(t)=N- n,(t) is the number of agents selecting action 4. The a parameter measures the 
weight of the self-reinforcing component of the selection process, while E captures 
components which are indipendent from the choice of the other agents38. It is possible to show 
the existence of a limit distribution (cf. Kirman (1992) and (1993), Orlean (1992), Topol 
(1991)). Depending on the values of a ,  the population may oscillate between the two states 
with the limit distribution itself determining the average frequencies at which the system is 
observed in each state in the limit. 
A second modelling strategy considers infinitely growing populations, where at each time 
step t a new agent makes a once-and-forever choice of action a, with probability depending on 
the relative frequencies of past choices. In these models (cf., among the others, Arthur, 
Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1983), Dosi and Kaniovski (1994), Kaniovski and Young (1994), 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993)) learning takes place primarily at the population level (agents 
cannot change their decision) and this occurs in a typical "incremental" fashion. 
The population dynamics can be described by an equation of the type : 
where N, is the size of the population after t arrivals of "new agents", x,(t) is the share of the 
population which has chosen action a, and ~(x(t) , t)  is a stochastic term with zero mean, 
independent in t. The function f, embeds possible self-reinforcing mechanisms, and its 
functional form determines the number and the stability properties of fixed points. In case of 
multiple equilibria, the process is generally non-ergodic (i.e. it displays path-dependency), 
and convergence to one or another equilibrium depends on initial conditions and sequences of 
"early" choices (cf. Arthur et al. (1984), Glaziev and Kaniovski (1991)). 
It is worth pointing out that in the former class of models with finite population, also in the 
limit the population might keep oscillating between states and spend some fraction of time on 
each of them. Models can only predict the limit distribution and, possibly, the average time 
the population spends on each of the states which have in the limit positive probability 
measure39. In the latter infinitely increasing population models, instead, the size of the 
population goes to infinity in the limit and the system will almost surely be found in one of 
the absorbing states. But if such absorbing states are multiple, which one is selected depends 
on initial conditions and on the path followed by the system in finite time4'. 
38 As mentioned above, we skip here any technical details, such as, for example, the not-so-minor difficulty of 
keeping such dynamics as those represented in eq. 3 consistently on the unit simplex. 
39 It is true that after determining the limit distribution as t+w, one might collapse it to a measure-one mass 
corresponding to one of the equilibria by further assuming that E+O (i.e. that the "error" or "search" term 
vanishes). However, it seems to us that this is primarily a display of technical virtuoso, with not much 
interpretative value added (note also, in this respect, that if one takes the assumption of E+O as realistic, one 
must, symmetrically, allow a speed of convergence to the "good" equilibrium which goes to zero). 
40 Note also that the infinite-population case, most often formalised through generalised Polya urns (for a 
survey and applications, cf. Dosi and Kaniovski (1994)), allows a much easier account of dynamic increasing 
Moreover, in both classes of models, it is assumed that agents base their decisions on 
observed frequencies. Thus, if these models are to be taken as representation of distributed, 
agent-based, learning, such information must be somehow available to them : for example, a 
plausible interpretation of e.g. Arthur, Ermoliev and Kaniovski (1983) is that frequencies are 
free public information (possibly with noisy disturbance), while Dosi, Ermoliev and 
Kaniovski (1994) assume that agents estimate frequencies by observing a sample of the 
population. 
Finally, note that in the models with infinite population no learning takes place at the level of 
a single agent, as the latter cannot modify its once-and-for-all decision, while in finite 
population models some primitive form of individual learning does accur as agents modify 
their actions according some observation of the behaviour of the other agents. 
In fact, all this hints at a more general issue, namely the interaction between, so to speak, "the 
weight of history" and agents' abilities to extract information from it. For example, Arthur 
and Lane (1993) consider a model of choice between two technologies A and B with a 
feedback between past adoptions and choice criteria. The states of the world represent the 
properties of such technologies S = { S ~ , S ~ }  : these are unknown to agents, who only hold prior 
distributions N(pA,oA) and N(pB,oB). At each time t one agent adopts one of the two 
technologies by maximising his expected utility : 
where U is utility function (with constant risk-aversion) and n ( c , l ~ )  is the posterior 
distribution computed as follows. When an agents makes its choice, it samples z agents 
among those who have already chosen. X is thus a vector of dimension z, whose components 
are each single observation in the sample, which is supposed to be drawn from a normal 
distribution with finite variance : 
By applying Bayesian updating agents can compute posterior distributions and choose the 
technology with higher expected utility. 
Interestingly, it can be shown that in these circumstances, notwithstanding the procedural 
"rationality" of the agents, the dynamics might lead to collective lock-in into the "inferior" 
option (but, remarkably, in Lane and Vescovini (1996) apparently less "rational" decision 
rules turn out to be dynamically more efficient from a collective point of view). 
Note that this model is equivalent to a learning model with single agent and environmental 
feed-back : at each time t the agent observes z realisations of the states of the world, where 
returns. Formally, the latter imply some equivalent to a possibly unboundedly increasing potential function. 
Conversely, all the finite-population cases we are aware of are driven by some equivalent to an invariant 
conservation principle. As we see it, learning most often does imply dynamic increasing returns : e.g., even in 
the most tnvial cases, efforts in search, when successful, yield relatively easy replication (and thus near-zero 
marginal costs). A straightforward implication is that history matters, and increasingly so as the process goes 
on. The fact that so far, in the finite-population cases one must formally rely upon time-invariant Markov 
processes most often carries - due to the formal properties of the model itself - conclusions that the system 
may fluctuate also in the limit across action patterns (or systems of collective representations). We do not have 
any problem in accepting the heuristic value of the conclusion under bounded increasing returns (such as those 
stemming from informational interdipencies on e.g. financial markets), but we have great reservations in the 
cases when returns to knowledge are in principle unbounded.. 
the probability that each observation is generated by A or B is initially identical and is then 
modified through Bayesian updating, but this very learning process will change the 
distribution from which the agent samples the following time step by producing a feed-back 
on the states of the world (In this respect, notice incidentally that empirically agents tend to 
display much less procedural rationality than that postulated here, leading to systematic 
misperception even in simple deterministic environments : cf. Sterman (1989a) and (1989b)). 
Models with local learning. 
The class of models illustrated above assume that agents base their actions on some global 
observation of (or feedback with) the population or a sample thereof. Another perspective 
describes instead set-ups where agents respond to some local observation of the characteristic 
of a given subset of the population. Agents only observe their "neighbours" (cf. for instance 
Kirman (1994), David (1993), and Dalle (1993) and (1994)) defined according to some 
spatial or socio-economic measure of distance. Let be d(i,j) the distance between agent i and j 
and be d' a given threshold, the set of agents who are neighbours of agent i is defined as : 
If the set Vi are not mutually disjoint, it is possible that local phenomena of learning and 
adaptation (i.e. inside a given neighbourhood) spread to the entire population. 
One way of modelling this kind of processes is based on Markov fields (e.g. Allen (1982), An 
and Kiefer (1995), Dalle (1994), Durlauf (1994), Orlkan (1990)) assuming that agents 
stochastically select their actions depending on the actions or "states" of their neighbours. 
Suppose for instance that payoffs increase in the degrees of coordination with neighbours. 
Collective outcomes will depend upon the strength of the incentives (as compared to some 
"internal" motivation of each agent) : when incentives are not strong enough, high levels of 
heterogeneity will persist ; conversely, if premium on coordination is high enough, the system 
will spend most of its time in states of maximal coordination (though it might keep oscillating 
between them, cf. Kirman (1993))"'. 
Another class of models assume that agents choose their action deterministically (cf. Blume 
(1993) and (1994), Berninghaus and Schwalbe (1992) and (1996), Anderlini and Ianni 
(1993), Hertz (1994), Nowak and May (1992) and (1993), in ways that are basically 
isomorphic to simple cellular automata, whereby the state of each agent depends, according to 
some deterministic rule, on the states of its neighbours. 
Certainly, having some space which specifies learning mechanisms, in principle conditional 
on "where a particular agent belongs", is a fruitful development in accounting for 
heterogeneity and path-dependency in processes of adaptive learning". However, note also 
that in terms of how learning occurs, a fixed "spatial" structure implies indeed a "structure" - 
being it on metaphorically geographical, technological or cultural spaces - which ought to be 
phenomenologically justified : on the contrary, it is lamentable to find most often e.g. a two- 
dimensional lattice, a taurus, etc. being introduced with careless casualness. 
In the perspective discussed so far, both stochastic and deterministic models of local learning 
consider learning as a selection over a fixed menu of actions. However, an alternative 
4 1 Such results however do not seem to show much robustness with respect to both the algorithm that agents 
use to choose actions and the size of the population (cf. Follmer (1974) and I-Iors and Lordon (1995)). 
42 An important limitations of these models is the rigidity with which the structure of the neighbourhood is 
defined. However, Kirman, Oddou and Weber (1986) and Ioannides (1990) Bala and Goyal (1993) have given 
a more general formulation, in which the very structure of the graph is modified stochastically. 
interpretation suggest that they could somehow model also processes of learning in the (fixed) 
space of representations. 
Consider N agents on a bi-dimensional graph who select among k possible actions, and 
assume further that : 
the set of states of the world is given by all the Nk possible configurations of the graph 
(assuming that the action taken by the corresponding agent characterises the state of a node) 
agents hold a partial representation of such a set S, as they only observe a part of the state of 
the world, i.e. that given by the state of its neighbours. 
An agent's neighbourhood represent a sort of window through which it can only observe a 
part of the world : thus the agents try to adaptively infer the state of the entire graph from 
such window observation. But, given this interpretation, we should expect that learning 
should involve a progressive "enlargement of the window" so that agents could achieve an 
ever more complete picture of the world. Some results show that above a threshold of 
interconnection in the graph all agents globally converge to a state where they implicitly 
access to all the information available in the system (cf. Bala and Goyal (1993), Hammersley 
and Welsh (1980), Grimmet (1989)). However, there seem to be no monotonicity in the 
relation between the "width of the window" and the asymptotic quality of the learning 
process (holding the nature of interconnections constant, between agents and between the past 
and the present). 
Population-level vs. agent-level learning. 
We have already remarked that one way of interpreting standard evolutionary games is in 
terms of agents who are simple replicators which, individually, do not actually learn 
anything : only the population does. More sophisticated models (cf. for instance the already 
mentioned contribution by Young (1993)) take a different route and are also meant to explore 
some (boundedly rational) cognitive capability of agents, such as some memory of previous 
events and some simple decision-making algorithms4'. But it is clear that, with some 
modification, these kind of selection based models have an immediate appeal also as models 
of individual learning : once the population of individuals - each characterised by a single 
action - has been replaced by a single individual who adaptively learn to select among a set 
of possible actions at his disposal. Stochastic approximation models of adaptive beliefs try to 
move in this direction. The basic idea behind these models can be cast in the following way. 
Suppose that the learning agent has a set of actions A={al, a2, ....., a,) ; does not know the 
realisation of the state of the world st, but only perceives a realised payoff nt. In this case a 
rational Bayesian decision maker should form prior beliefs on all the possible payoff 
matrices. An adaptive learner instead randomly chooses among actions according to some 
strength which he attaches to actions. Let us call F,' the strength assigned to action ak at time 
t. The strength is updated according, say, to the rule : 
Actions are randomly selected at t with probabilities given by 
4 3  A further step towards models of agent-level learning could be introduced by labelling agents (cf. the models 
with local learning presented below). 
This selection mechanism induces a stochastic process on the strengths assigned to competing 
rules whose asymptotic behaviour can be studied. 
This and similar selection mechanisms can be found, for instance, in Arthur (1993), Posch 
(1994), Easley and Rustichini (1995), Fudenberg and Levine (1995), Marimon and 
McGrattan (1995). Easley and Rustichini's model, in particular, provides a neat connection 
between population-level and individual-level evolutionary arguments. In their model, Easley 
and Rustichini consider an individual decision maker facing an unknown environment 
represented by a stochastic variable. Instead of forming beliefs on the set of possible 
processes and updating them according to the Bayesian approach, he adaptively selects 
among a set of behavioural rules % (of the same kind of our basic model) according to a 
strength updating rule of the kind of expression (6) and a random selection rule of the kind of 
expression (7). This enables them to study the stochastic process induced on the strengths of 
rule ri, which is given by the expression : 
With some further assumptions on the characteristics of the underlying stochastic process on 
the states of the world (stationarity and ergodicity) and on the selection dynamics 
(monotonicity, symmetry and independence) they are able to prove that an individual who 
uses this kind of adaptive selection dynamics eventually acts as if it was an objective expected 
utility maximiser and, moreover, that the set of rules which are selected by such dynamics 
corresponds to the set of rules which would be selected by a replicator dynamics. Some 
considerations on the importance and limitations of these kinds of models are in order. 
First of all, note that these approaches end up being pure adaptation/selection models. It is 
indeed an encouraging result that such simple selection mechanisms are a some times (but not 
always) able to select behavioural rules which mimic optimising behaviour prescribed by 
normative theories, but of course a necessary (and highly demanding) condition for such 
behaviour to be selected is that it is there in the first place. Populations must contain 
optimising individual in order to have them selected by replication mechanisms of selection. 
On the same token, rules which mimic expected utility maximising behaviour must be in the 
decision maker's endowment of behavioural rules in order to have them asymptotically 
selected by the strength updating process. One could say that, by moving from standard 
models of optimising behaviour to stochastic models of adaptive learning, one moves from a 
world where agents are assumed to be naturally endowed with the correct model of the world, 
to a world where agents are endowed with the correct behavioural rules (which define an 
implicit model of the world), but these are mixed together with incorrect ones and have to 
adaptively emerge. It is clear that the latter assumption amounts to assuming away the 
cognitive problem of how such rules are formed and modified. In complex and changing 
environments in particular, it seems a rather farfetched assumption to start with. In fact 
stationarity in the underlying selection environment, is a fair approximation whenever one 
can reasonably assume that the speed of convergence to given fundamentals is of order of 
magnitude faster than the rate of change in the fundamentals themselves. Ergodicity comes 
here as a handy auxiliary property : if it does not hold much more detail is needed on initial 
conditions and adjustment processes. Relatedly, an important question concerns how long the 
selection process takes to select good rules". 
Second, and again related to the previous points, as in Easley and Rustichini (1995) suppose 
that, at each stage of the adaptive learning process, the strength of all rules is updated 
according to the payoff they would have received in the realised state of the world. This 
assumption is justified if and only if the learning agent's actions do not determine any feed- 
back on the environment and if and only if the agent knows it. When this is not the case, only 
the strength of the actually employed rule can be updated and therefore lock-in phenomena 
and non-ergodicity may well emerge : exploitation vs. exploration and multi-armed-bandit 
type dilemmas are unavoidable. 
These quite fundamental questions in fact hints at some general issues, a fortiori emerging in 
fully fledged evolutionary environments. And, indeed a theoretical in order to explore them is 
based on so-called Artificially Adaptive Agents, which are briefly examined in the next 
section. 
Artificially Adaptive Agents. 
If we drop the assumption that agents are naturally endowed with the correct model of the 
environment in which they operate, the fundamental topic of inquiry becomes how models 
and representations of the world are generated, stored and modified by economic agents. On 
the one hand, as we have already argued, this consideration carries the requirement for some 
form of cognitive and psychological grounding. On the other hand it opens new possibilities 
for applications to economics of families of models developed in Artificial Intelligence, and 
especially in that branch of A1 which considers selection and variation mechanisms as a basic 
driving force for learning. 
The main point of interest in this kind of models is that the dynamics involved is essentially 
open-ended, both when the object of the modelling exercise is the dynamics of multi-agent 
interactions and when instead modelling concerns individual learning (for a general overview 
on the AAA perspective in economics see, for instance, Arthur (1993) and Lane (1993a) and 
(1993b))". Open-ended dynamics is a consequence of two strong theoretical commitments of 
the AAA perspective. Firstly, AAA models are not restricted to pure selection dynamics, but 
consider the introduction of novelty, innovation, generation of new patterns of behaviour as a 
basic force for learning and adaptation. Thus the dynamics never really settles into 
equilibrium states. 
Second, the AAA perspective considers heterogeneity among agents and complexity of 
interaction patterns (among agents in models of collective interaction, among behavioural 
rules in models of individual learning) as crucial aspects of the modelling exercise. In fact, in 
the AAA approach heterogeneity among agents (in terms of representations, expectations, 
learning paths) is the norm and homogeneity the exception : therefore seemingly persistent 
44 Some considerations on this problem can be found in Arthur (1993), who argues that the speed of 
convergence is highly sensitive to the variance of payoffs associated to different actions. Of course the longer 
the convergence process, the more implausible appears the assumption of stationarity of the environment. 
4s All this, notwithstanding the spreading practice of using AAA models to show adaptive convergence to 
conventional equilibria (often characterised by seemingly "rational" forward-looking behaviours at the 
equilibrium itself). Of course we do not deny that sometimes adaptive AAA learning might lead there. 
However, we consider the epistemological commitment to the search of those adaptive processes displaying 
such limit properties (often at the cost also of ad hoc rigging of the learning assumptions) as a somewhat 
perverse use of AAA modelling techniques. 
equilibria tend to be in fact transient states of temporary "ecological" stability, where small 
variation can trigger non linear self-reinforcing effects. 
An interesting prototypical example of AAA can be found in Lindgren (1991). He considers a 
classical repeated prisoner's dilemma played by a given population of players. Each agent is 
defined by a strategy, which deterministically maps finite-lengths histories of the game (here 
represented by sequences of Defeat or Cooperate actions performed by the player itself and 
his opponent) into an action (Defect or Cooperate). This population is then processed via an 
extended genetic algorithm which allows for variable length genomes. Simply allowing for 
strategies based on variable length histories makes the number of possible species in the 
population practically infinite and the search space unlimited. Hence, evolution is no longer a 
selection path in a finite and closed space of alternatives, but "[ .......I can then be viewed as a 
transient phenomenon in a potentially infinite-dimensional dynamical system. If the transients 
continue forever, we have open-ended evolution" (Lindgren (1991), p. 296, emphasis in 
original). 
The dimension and complexity of strategies becomes itself one of the elements subject to 
evolutionary selection and variation. This perspective enriches the concept of strategy implicit 
in the standard evolutionary game framework. While in the latter "strategy" is most often 
squeezed down to an action taken from a given set of possibilities, in AAA models, it is easy 
to account for evolving "strategies" made up by changing combinations of a set of basic 
operators, categories, variables. (However, what is still missing in AAA models is the 
possibility to model learning as a modification of this set of basic operators, variables, 
detectors of environmental states, unless they originate from some combination of the 
elementary ones with which the system is initially endowed). In terms of our earlier basic 
model, this difference amounts to an explicit search process regarding the algorithm mapping 
"internal" representations to action patterns (in the case of AAA models), as compared to its 
"black-boxing" into adaptive selection of actions themselves (in the case of most evolutionary 
games). This distinction is even clearer in more explicitly rule-based AAA models. 
Rule-based AAA models differ from the stochastic models outlined in the previous section at 
least in two fundamental respects. They consider learning as the joint outcome of the 
processes of generation, replication, selection and modification of behavioural rules. As the 
space of behavioural rules is potentially unlimited - even in relatively simple problems - and 
the very search space is ill-defined and subject to change, the generation of new rules, new 
representations and new actions is an essential mechanism for learning and adaptation. 
The second aspect, related to the previous one, is that, except in very simple problems nested 
in stationary environments, the outcome of the learning process cannot be constrained to be a 
single behavioural rule, but may be a whole "ecological" system of rules which together form 
a representation of the environment (on the so-called "computational ecologies" see also 
Huberman amd Hogg (1995)). Behavioural patterns which emerge in AAA models may 
therefore be much richer than those predicted by pure selection models. Here, learning takes 
explicitly place in both spaces of representations/models of the world and action repertoires". 
A prototypical example of rule-based learning models is represented by the so-called 
Classifiers Systems (cf. Holland (1986), Holland et al. (1986), for an overview of actual and 
46 In this respect, a particularly interesting question concerns the circumstances under which simple 
behavioural patterns do emerge notwithstanding the potential cognitive complexity which these models entail. 
In Dosi et al. (1995) we show that this is often the case in the presence of competence gaps of the agent vis-2- 
vis the complcxity of the changing environment (see also below). 
possible applications to economics Arthur (1991) and (1993) and Lane (1993b), for some 
specific applications Marimon, McGrattan and Sargent ( 1990), Marengo ( 1992), Marengo 
and Tordjman (1996), for a survey see also Hoffmeister and Back (1991)). 
Learning in Classifiers Systems presents the following general features : 
learning takes place in the space of representations. In a complex and ever changing world 
agents must define sets of states which they consider as equivalent for the purpose of action. 
In other words, they have to build representations of the world in order to discover 
regularities which can be exploited by their actions. These representations have a pragmatic 
nature and are contingent upon the particular purpose the routine is serving. 
learning must be driven by the search for better performance. Learning agents must therefore 
use some system of performance assessment. 
if rules of behaviour have to be selected, added, modified and discarded, there must exist a 
procedure for the evaluation of the usefulness of rules. This problem might not have a clear 
solution when the performance of the system may be assessed only as a result of a long and 
complex sequence of interdependent rules (such as in the game of chess, for instance). 
Let us consider again the basic model of decision making introduced above and suppose that 
it is faced repeatedly by the same agent. The decision maker, by using its experience of the 
previous stages of the game, makes a forecast of the state of the world which will occur next 
and chooses an action which he or she considers as appropriate. At the outset the player has 
no knowledge either of the payoff matrix or of the "laws" which determine the changes in the 
environment. The decision process consists therefore of two elements : the state of knowledge 
about the environment, represented by the agent's forecasting capabilities, and the rules for 
choosing an action, given this forecast. 
In its most basic formulation, a Classifier System is a set condition-action rules which are 
processed in parallel. Each rules makes the execution of a certain action conditional upon the 
agent's perception of a certain state of the world. A first element which characterises a 
classifier system is the message (signal) the learning agents receives from the environment. 
Such a message has to be interpreted and connected to a consequent action according to a 
model of the world which is subject to revisions. The signal is usually encoded as a binary 
string of given length : 
ml m2 ..... m, with mi E {O,l } 
The learning is modelled as a set of condition-action rules which are processed in a parallel 
fashion. Each rule makes a particular action conditional upon the fulfilment of a condition 
concerning the present state of the world. The condition part is therefore actually made up of 
a string of the same length as the message's, which encode a subset of the states of nature and 
is activated when the last detected state of the world falls into such a subset : 
clc2 ..... c, with c; E { O , l , # }  
The condition is satisfied when, either Ci = mi or ci = # ; i.e. the symbol # acts as a "don't 
care" symbol which does not pose any constraint on the corresponding bit of the 
environmental message. 
Thus, consistently with the framework discussed in the previous section, a set of conditions 
defines a subset of the power set of S. It is important to notice that each condition defines one 
subjective state of the world, as perceived by the agent and defines its relationship with the 
objective states of the world. This relationship remains anyway unknown to the decision 
maker, who "knows" only the subjective states. 
The action part is instead a string of length p (the number of the agent's possible actions) over 
some alphabet (usually a binary one) which encodes possible actions : 
a l a  2.....a with ai E (0.1 } 
P 
The decision maker can be therefore represented by a set of such condition-action rules : 
R = {Rl,R2 ,..... Rq} 
where : 
Ri : c1c 2 . . . . ~  + a a 
n 1 2. . . .a~ with ci E {0,1,#} and ai E {0,1} 
In addition each rule is assigned a "strength" and a "specificity" (or its reciprocal 
"generality") measure. The strength basically measures the past usefulness of the rule, that is 
the payoffs cumulated every time the rule has been applied (minus other quantities which will 
be specified later) ; the specificity measures the strictness of the condition : the highest 
specificity (or lowest generality) value is given to a rule whose condition does not have nay 
symbol " #  and therefore is satisfied only when that particular state of the world occurs, 
whereas the lowest specificity (or the highest generality) is given to a rule whose condition is 
entirely formed by "#'s" and is therefore always satisfied by the occurrence of any state of the 
world. 
At the beginning of each simulation the decision maker is usually supposed to be absolutely 
ignorant about the characteristics of the environment : thus all the rules are initially randomly 
generated. The decision maker is also assumed to have limited computational capabilities, 
therefore the number of rules stored in the system at each moment is kept constant and 
relatively "small" in comparison to the complexity of the problem which is being tackled. 
This set of rules is processed in the following steps throughout the simulation process : 
Condition matching : a message is received from the environment which informs the system 
about the last state of the world. Such message is compared with the condition of all the rules 
and the rules which are matched, i.e. those which apply to such a state of the world enter the 
following step. 
Competition among matched rules : all the rules whose condition is satisfied compete in order 
to designate the one which is allowed to execute its action. To enter this competition each rule 
makes a bid based on its strength and on its specificity. In other words, the bid of each 
matched rule is proportional to its past usefulness (strength) and its relevance to the present 
situation (specificity) : 
Bid(Ri,t) = kl(k2 + k3Specificity(Ri)) Strength(Ri,t) 
Where kl ,  k2 and k are constant coefficients. 3 
The winning rule is chosen randomly, with probabilities proportional to such bids. 
Action and strength updating : the winning rule executes the action indicated by its action part 
and has its own strength reduced by the amount of the bid and increased by the payoff that the 
action receives, given the occurrence of the "real" state of the world. If the j-th rule is the 
winner of the competition, we have : 
Generation of new rules : the system must be able not only to select the most successful rules, 
but also to discover new ones. This is ensured by applying "genetic operators" which, by 
recombining and mutating elements of the already existing and most successful rules, 
introduce new ones which could improve the performance of the system. In this way new 
rules are constantly injected into the system and scope for new search is always made 
available. 
Genetic operators generate new rules which both recombine "building blocks" of, and, 
explore other possibilities in the proximity of the presently most successful ones, in order to 
discover the elements which determine their success and exploit them more thoroughly : the 
search is not completely random but influenced by the system's past history. New rules so 
generated substitute the weakest ones, so that the total number of rules is kept constant. 
Three types of genetic operators are normally employed. The first two types are forms of 
simple mutation which operate in opposite directions : 
Specification : a new condition is created which increases the specificity of the parent one : 
wherever the parent condition presents a " # ,  this is mutated into a "0" or a "1" (randomly 
chosen) with a given (small) probability. 
Generalisation : the new condition decreases the specificity of the parent one : wherever the 
latter presents a "0" or a "l", this is mutated into a " #  with a given (small) probability. 
The third operator is a standard crossover, which reflects the idea of generating new 
conditions by recombining useful elements ("building blocks") of the conditions of successful 
rules. Two parent rules are probabilistically selected among the ones with higher strength, 
then a random crossover point is selected for each condition part and strings are exchanged 
across such crossover points. 
If, for instance, the conditions of the two parent rules' are : 
aaaaaa 
AAAAAA 
with a, A E {0,1,#) 
if 2 is randomly drawn as crossover point, the two following offsprings are generated : 
aaAAAA 
Aaaaaa 
The above mentioned economic models which employ classifiers systems for the analysis of 
multi-agent interaction problem, basically study the emergence of "ecologies of 
representations". Heterogeneous agents adaptively modify their models of the world in order 
to achieve better performance, and stationary environments tend to generate relatively stable 
ecological equilibria, but, in general, agents will not converge to homogeneous models, but 
only to models which are somehow "compatible" for the particular states of the world which 
actually occur. The same environment can in fact support very diverse non-partitional 
representations : stochastic elements in the learning process, combined with the high degree 
of path-dependency of the systems, will very likely produce a high degree of diversity of 
representations even when we begin with perfectly homogeneous agents. Moreover, learning 
never actually stops and the application of the genetic algorithm always introduce an element 
of exploration of new possibilities which might disrupt the temporary ecological equilibrium. 
Marengo (1992) and (1996) applies this model to the emergence of a commonly shared 
knowledge basis in team decision making processes, and shows that different types of 
environment can generate very different balances between homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
knowledge. Palmer et al. (1996), Vriend (1996) and Marengo and Tordjman (1996) examine 
a population of rule-based AAA operating in an artificial markets and show that the market 
can sustain persistently high degree of diversity between agents' models of the world and 
generate at the same time a price dynamics which has many features in common with real 
speculation markets phenomena. 
A slightly different modelling strategy, albeit very much in the same spirit, employs Genetic 
Programming (Koza (1993)) : unlike standard genetic algorithms and classifiers systems, 
search does not take place in the space of fixed-length binary string representations, but in the 
space of all variable length functions which can be generated with a given primitive set of 
operators and operands. Representations here are no longer mere sets of subsets of subjective 
states of the world, but are more complex functional relationships which link variables to 
actions by means of mathematical and logical operators. Dosi, Marengo, Bassanini and 
Valente (1994) show an application of this methodology to pricing decisions by firms in 
oligopolistic markets47. 
In general, these models produce simulations of Artificial Economies (in parallel with the 
"Artificial Life" approach, cf. Langton (1989), Langton et al. (1991)), in which the analysis is 
no longer based on equilibrium concepts and on the search for convergence and stability 
conditions, but on the investigation of collective emergent properties, i.e. aggregate 
regularities which are relatively robust and persistent (cf. Lane (1993a) and (1993b)). 
An interesting family of Artificial Economies models analyses local learning phenomena. For 
instance, Axtell and Epstein (1994) consider a population of agents located on a bi- 
dimensional space where some resources (e.g. food) are also (unevenly) distributed. Agents 
are endowed with a set of simple algorithms which control their movements, their use of 
available resources, their behaviour towards other agents they can meet. Adaptation takes 
place at two different levels : a) with respect to the environment agents move towards sites 
where they more easily fulfil their objectives ; b) with respect to their neighbours, they 
generate local organisation of exchange (i.e. markets where they can exchange goods and 
achieve Pareto-superior distribution of resources). Take all this as a preliminary metaphor of 
a set of models still to come where propositions of economic theory (e.g. downward sloping 
demand curves, laws of one price, etc.) could be derived as emergent properties of 
decentralised interaction processes. 
Learning as dynamics in the space of outcomes. 
The typologies of learning models review so far attempt, to different degrees, to provide 
some account of the dynamics of e.g. what agents know about the world, or the ways people 
select among different actions, etc. Alternative modelling strategies involve, on the contrary, 
an explicit black-boxing of the learningldecision processes, folding them together into some 
dynamics on the possible states in which the agents might happen to be. In turn, this "black- 
boxing" in some approaches has to be considered as just a reduced form of an underlying 
richer dynamics on cognition, problem-solving ,etc., while in others tends to be considered 
almost all that can be said about learning. 
The latter perspective certainly applies to a long tradition of formal models in psychology 
building on stimulus-response processes, dating back at least to Estes (1950) and Bush and 
Mosteller (1955). (Note that insofar as the "states", - through which the agents are driven by 
reinforcement -, are behavioural responses, this modelling philosophy largely overlaps with 
that of "evolutionary games", briefly discussed earlier). 
A good summary of the basic ideas is from Suppes (1995) : 
"The organism is presented with a sequence of trials, on each of which he makes a response, that is one 
of several possible choices. In any particular experiment it is assumed that there is a set of stimuli from 
which the organism draws a sample at the beginning of each trial. It is also assumed that on each trial 
each stimulus is conditioned to at most one response. The probability of making a given response on 
any trial is postulated to be simply the proportion of sampled stimuli conditioned on that response, 
unless there is no conditioned stimuli in the sample, in which case there is a "guessing" probability for 
each response. Learning takes place in the following way. At the end of the trial a reinforcement event 
47 In particular, it has been shown there the endogenous emergence of pricing routines as an evolutionary 
robust form of adaptation to non-stationary environments. 
occurs that identifies which one of the possible response was correct. With some fixed probabilities the 
sample stimuli become conditioned to this response, if they are not already, and the organism begins 
another trial in a new state of conditioning ... (Suppes (1995), p. 5). 
Notice that here all dynamics on O, E, R, and .n one was trying to disentangle above are 
black-boxed into the distribution of stimuli and the conditional probabilities of transition 
across responses. 
A simple illustration (Suppes (1995)) with two states, one conditioned to the correct response 
( C) and the other unconditioned (U) is a Markov process of the type 
with the elements of the matrix being the transition probabilities. Not too surprising, 
"learning is the convergence to the absorbing state". 
Moreover, notice that the basic methodology requires an underlying "small"/stationary world 
assumption (all states must have from the start a positive probability measure) and is 
essentially looking for asymptotic properties of the models"'. 
Technological learning. 
Nearer to the spirit of a good deal of contemporary evolutionary theories, a quite different 
type of "black-boxing" is common to a lot of models of growth and industrial change driven 
by technological advances. Here the learning dynamics is typically represented in terms of 
changes in the space of some technological coefficients. 
Possibly the simplest formalisation is the early account by Arrow (1962) of learning-by- 
doing, since then corroborated by a few empirical studies, showing a "quasi-law" of falling 
costs (or increasing productivity) as a function of cumulated production". 
In Silverberg, Dosi and Orsenigo (1988), learning how to efficiently use a new capital 
embodied technology (i.e. a new "paradigm" : see above) is formalised via a logistic-type 
dynamics on firm-specific skills (si), dependent on current and cumulated production using 
the new technology 
(xi and Xi , respectively) : 
Xi 
s,' = B,  p Xi + Si (I-'; ) 
S, = s  P otherwise 
48 It is true that in some simple experimental set-ups stimulus-response models generate also predictions on the 
convergence paths. But this is not the case in general, especially outside the domains whereby stimulus 
sampling and conditioning can be given a straightforward psychological interpretation (representation-building 
and problem-solving are two cases to the point). So, for example, one is left to wonder what is the empirical 
content of the "main theorem", from Suppes (1969) (see also (1995)) according to which "given any finite 
automaton, there is a stimulus-response model that under appropriate learning conditions asymptotically 
becomes isomorphic to the finite automaton". 
One is very far indeed from any constructive, empirically disciplined, notion of learning ... 
49 Something like 
ct = co xtP , the cumulated production, = Zt x t ; - 1 < P< o ; and c = unit production costs 
where s,' is he time derivative, C is a constant proportional to the capital stock and s, is the 
level of skills generally available in the industry, which is a sort of dynamic, industry-wide, 
externality changing as 
with F a weighted average of firm-specific skills 
Further, many evolutionary models starting from the seminal work of Nelson and Winter 
(1982), explicitly account for the uncertainty associated with technical search, and often, also 
for the dependence of future discoveries upon the knowledge already achieved in the past. In 
the last resort, modelling learning in the technology space comes down to specification of the 
stochastic process driving agents from one technique to the next. 
For example, in one of the models presented in Nelson and Winter (1982), learning occurs in 
the space of two variable input coefficients a l  and a2. After some renormalisation ", assume 
that the technique of each firm at time t is the random pair U, , V, and the search outcome is 
represented by the random pair (G, , H,) which capture the number of steps that the firm takes 
in the U and V dimensionss2, with (G, , H,) - in the simplest formulation, independent of (UtV1 , 
V,,,) - distributed on a finite support (Nelson and Winter (1982), pp. 177-9). The time- 
independent random process, together with a selection criterion simply comparing (UtP1 , V,,,) 
and (U, , V,) at prevailing input prices, implies that the sequence of techniques is a Markov 
chains3. The distribution of innovative outcomes is centred on the prevailing productivity of a 
firm and, in the more general formulation, there is no exogenous constraint on technological 
possibilities (Nelson and Winter (1982), p. 285), although there is one related to internal 
capabilities : what one knows limits what one can achieve within a given number of search 
periods. 
Other representations in a similar spirit include Silverberg and Lehnart (1994) whereby 
innovations arrive according to a Poisson distribution, adding to the productivity of new 
technological vintages of equipment ; Chiaromonte and Dosi (1993), and Chiaromonte et al. 
(1993) which have the support of the probability distributions on (labour) coefficients for 
"machine" production and machine-use dependent on time T realisations for each firm ; Dosi 
et al. (1994 a) and (1995), who model the dynamics of (proportional) increments in firm 
"competitiveness" drawn from different variants of a Poisson process ; Kwasnicki (1996) who 
presents more complex dynamics of search driven also recombination and mutation on 
incumbent knowledge bases (see also below). 
50 Of course, s; and sp are bounded to be less or equal to one (i.e. the "perfect" ability to fully exploit the 
technical specifications of use on any one given vintage of capital). 
Somewhat more complicated learning patterns, modelled in a similar spirit, are in Eliasson (1985). 
A "Verdoorn-Kaldor" law, with learning driven by learning-by-doing and economics of scale underpins the 
model by Verspagen (1993). And system-level deterministic learning dynamics is presented in Granstrand 
(1994b). 
5 1 So that the refined dimensions are U = log (a2 1 al)  and V = log (a1 a2). 
52 Subject to the constraint that ul I U 5 un . Conversely, V, itself a proxy for input productivity, in the spirit 
of evolutionary models, is allowed to range on - x < V < + x.  
53 (cf. Nelson and Winter (1982) pp. 179-92). Note also that in this Nelson - Winter model, while in terms of 
relative input intensities the process define a finite, time-invariant, Markov process, in the V - dimension the 
number of states is notionally infinite and the system is allowed, so to speak, to climb to ever greater levels of 
productivity (although only finite levels of them are accessible from a given state). 
In other versions of evolutionary models, one assumes an exogenously determined drift in 
learning opportunities (a metaphor for scientific advances, etc.). For example, in another 
model presented in Nelson and Winter (1982), firms sample from a log - normal distribution 
of values of capital productivities whose increasing mean follows a time dependent trend. 
And somewhat similarly, Conlisk (1989) postulate productivity growth driven by draws from 
a normal distribution (with positive mean). 
Finally a few evolutionary models account also for learning via imitation, that is by the 
stochastic access of each firm to the best practice available at each time or to the set of 
combinations between best practice and the technique currently known by any generic 
incumbent (cf. Nelson and Winter (1982), Chiaromonte et al. (1993), Silverberg and 
Verspagen (1994) and (1995a), Kwasnicki (1996), among others). First, note that the spirit of 
most formalisations of learning processes in a technology space, however defined, has an 
essential "phenomenological" flavour : formal representations are meant to capture stylised 
facts, basic dynamic regularities, etc. generally placed at a much "higher" (and more 
aggregate) level of description than the "foundational" processes of cognition, problem- 
solving, etc. discussed earlier (on the relationships between the two levels we shall come back 
in a moment). Given this more phenomenological level, however, a requirement far from 
fulfilled in the current state-of-the-art concerns the empirical robustness of the purported 
dynamics " : for example, on which empirical grounds does one justify the assumption of 
Poisson arrival processes ? Why not another random process ? On what criteria does one 
choose the specification of the Markov processes driving search ?, etc. 
This is an area where evolutionary modellers would certainly benefit from more precise 
insights coming from "inductive" statistical exercises concerning e.g. microeconomic 
processes of innovation, productivity growth, etc. 
Second, even when considering learning over an upper-bounded set of "knowledge states" 
(such as in Silverberg et al. (1988)), and, obviously so in open-ended knowledge dynamics, 
the analytical focus is upon transient rather than limit properties. An example in the set-up 
concerning innovation-diffusion and learning-by-using on two technologies is presented in 
Silverberg et al. (1988). The properties of limit states could in principle be found, given 
initial conditions, etc. However, the attention is mainly devoted to the finite-time properties of 
the system and the finite-time learning profile of individual agents. A fortiori, all this applies 
to learning dynamics which are open ended in the sense that there is an infinite number of 
states that agents can take as time goes to infinity, even if, most likely, conditional on given 
knowledge level, only a finite number of states can be reached with positive probability in a 
finite time55. 
Third, it seems to us rather straightforward that any representation of learning as a dynamics 
across technological (or for that matter "organisational") states in low dimensional spaces is 
just an inevitable (indeed, very useful) reduced form of underlying learning process in spaces 
of explosively high dimensionality (as those entailed by the earlier, more "constructive" 
discussion of exploration on cognitive and problem-solving categories ...56). But then the 
question of the compatibility and mappings across different levels of description becomes 
54 And this should be indeed a self-criticism of all of us who have been working on evolutionary modelling ... 
55  A major analytical challenge ahead regards in fact the possibility of characterising in the limit some expected 
(average) properties of these open-ended processes ( - an ongoing research involving S. Winter, Y. Kaniovski 
and the authors at IIASA, Austria, is currently beginning to painstakingly address the problem...). 
56 Collective learning entities such as "firms" further explode the space of searchladaptation ... 
crucial (let alone a direct derivation "higher" from "lower" levels, which might well turn out 
to be an impossible task without a lot of further phenomenological details and constraints : 
cf. our earlier "parable of the cow"....). 
Behavioural and cognitive foundations of technological learning. 
Of course, the easiest way to provide cognitive/behavioural foundations to learning in the 
technology space is by assuming that it is the direct outcome of the choices of fully rational 
(and forward looking) agents. This is, indeed, the path followed by "New Growth" theories - 
if their micro-foundations are to be taken at face value -. (cf. Romer(1990), Grossman and 
Helpman (1981), or, in a stochastic version, Aghion and Howitt (1992)'~. 
However, if one accepts the foregoing argument, fully 'rational' decision models fall well 
short of applicability to technological search and innovation : on the contrary, this is the 
domain where one is most likely to find strong substantive and procedural uncertainty, 
surprises, delusions and unexpected successes (for a review of the empirical evidence in this 
area, see Dosi (1988)). But then one is back to the relationships between a phenomenological 
account of learning processes and the underlying cognitive and behavioural procedures ... 
In this respect, Nelson and Winter(1982) suggest a promising appreciative theory, nesting 
technological learning (and some of its properties, such as the possible cumulativeness of 
technological advances, the 'locality' of search, etc.) into a theory of organisational learning, 
based - in a good part - on the establishment, reproduction and change of organisational 
routines. 
Moreover, Nelson-Winter, - as well as, earlier, the inspiring work of Cyert and March 
(1963),and later, many models in this evolutionary tradition - formally model the 'access' to 
change as being triggered or driven by some stylised decision rule. A way of capturing this 
bridge between the behavioural domain and an apparently "agent-free" learning dynamics is 
by assuming some sort of rather simple allocation-to-search rule (such as ".. invest x% of 
turnover in R&D ..") - which are indeed robustly corroborated by the managerial evidence - , 
and then formalise a probability of access to innovative (or imitative) learning dependent on 
these search efforts. 
A binomial distribution of the kind 
P(inn = 1) = a * exp (b * R&D) 
is a first approximation to the general idea (with a and b being parameters which implicit 
account for both 'objective' opportunities and firm-specific competencies)(Cf. e.g. Nelson 
and Winter(1982), Chiaromonte et a1.(1993))." 
Hence the learning dynamics is modelled as the outcome of a two-stages stochastic process, 
separating a first ('behavioural') process depending, in principle, on believes, expectations, 
57 This equally applies to e.g. game-theoretic models of innovation and diffusion, "patent races", etc. (thorough 
surveys are in Stoneman (1995)). 
Whether such microfoundations ought to be taken seriously is a debatable question. The more sophisticated 
view suggests that they should not - forward looking representative agents, etc. being only a sort of 
theoretical shortcut in order to get to some some aggregate dynamic properties which a forliori hold under 
less restrictive behavioural assumptions ( a lot of contributions of e.g. Paul Romer , and , in other perspectives, 
Joseph Stiglitz, and others are interpretable in this way). On the contrary, the conclusions of too many other 
models seem to be sensitively dependent upon the fine specifications of 'rational behaviours' themselves . 
58 And the same goes for imitation. 
and action patterns (that is the 6 ' s  and c's variables - in our erlier formulation - ),and a 
second one, trying to capture some modal properties of the learning process itself59. 
Other formalisations of the interactions between behaviours and learning modes stylise 
"triggering effects", so that for example, change and search is undertaken only if actual 
performance falls below a certain threshold level6'. 
For many analytical purposes, the assumption that behavioural rules (such as R&D- rules) are 
given and invariant throughout the history of each agent is a perfectly legitimate 
approximation (which captures also the relative inertia of organisational routines ..).And this 
is what one finds in many evolutionary models up to now. In fact, invariant search rules (or 
invariant 'meta-rules' for change) can be understood in two ways, namely (a) as empirically- 
grounded 'stylised facts', or, (b) as useful first-approximation assumptions whose precise 
status has to be understood also in terms of complementary processes of behavioural learning. 
They certainly capture a bit of both : but, in order to move further at the former level it is 
urgent to achieve more robust micro-behavioural evidence6', and , at, the latter level, to show 
if and how endogenous process of adaptation lead to relatively persistent (meta-stable )search 
rules. This latter analysis is what Silverberg and Verspagen (1995b) have begun to do, 
assuming rules that are invariant as such, but whose parameters may adaptively change via a 
stochastic search process ( with different modelling tools based on genetic algorithms 
Kwasnicki (1996) explores a similar path). 
Alternatively, one might want to take a more constructive route to behavioural search and 
adaptation, but, so far, at the cost of further simplifying the environment in which agents 
operate (an example is Dosi et a1.(1994),where "routines" like mark-up pricing are indeed 
shown, as already mentioned to be endogenous emergent properties but one totally neglects 
learning in the technology/problem-solving domain). More generally, technological learning 
is possibly one of most revealing points of observations in order to assess the state-of-the-art 
in the theories of learning in evolutionary environments. Hopefully, there should be little 
doubt that technologies (together with organisational forms and institutions) are major 
domains of economic evolution. Technical change is also one of the few fields where an 
explicitly-inspired evolutionary thinking has some widely acknowledged lead in the 
methodology of empirical reseach, appreciative theories, and also formal models. And it also 
continues to be a major challenge for all those scholars who want to take micro-foundations 
seriously .As it stands now, it is probably a crucial test for any foundations of cognition, 
decision and learning -at least in economics-,robust enough to account for what people and 
organisations do when they know inevitably little about what the future might deliver to 
them. In this respect, 'rational' formalisations sound sometimes helplessly silly ( ..suppose 
that stone-age men had rational expectations about helicopters, or more mundanely, that 
IBM's CEO's knew what a PC was and had whatever prior on their impact ...). But, competing 
interpretations face the equally formidable challenge to develop "level zero" theories 
59 Which, putting it into our earlier formalisation, would be a synthetic account of externally evaluated (or 
'market-evaluated') performances of the combinations between menus of actions and 'states of the world'. It is 
also important to notice that the general assumption here is that agents do not and cannot know that mapping 
algorithm. 
60 Cf. Nelson and Winter(1982) ,and also outside the technological domain Cyert and March(1963). 
6 1 Whose collection, interestingly enough, has nearly stopped after the 601s,as a result also of the conflict 
between what researchers were finding and the axiomatic boldness of the theory (cf. for example the neglect 
on mark-up findings with regards to pricing behaviours: a short but pertinent discussion is in Winter's chapter 
in Day and Graves (1975). 
consistent with "higher level" models of the empirical patterns of learning in e.g. companies, 
or industries, communities, or whole countries .. 
For the purposes of this work, let us just notice that a major step forward would come from 
constructive theories of entities that at higher levels of observations one calls "knowledge 
bases", "organisational competencies", "heuristics", etc. : that is, theories showing how 
elementary 'pieces of knowledge', or routines or elementary actions coherently combine 
together in higher level entities that self-maintain over time. But in turn, as convincingly 
argued by Fontana and Buss (1994) and (1996) in the domain of biology, this demands a 
constructive theory of organisations ,whose existence, on the contrary, is most often 
postulated rather than explained 62. 
6. Many Open Questions By Way of a Conclusion 
It was one of the purposes of this paper to provide a broad map of diverse lines of inquiry, 
which, different ways, take the analysis of cognition, action and learning beyond the 
boundaries of the canonical model of rational decision and rational learning. The underlying 
perspective - as we have tried to argue - is that a positive theory of agency in evolutionary 
environment will have to rely upon quite different building blocks as compared to the 
standard model. 
Despite the length of this essay, we have been forced to leave out a few pertinent issues. 
Let us conclude by flagging them out and suggest also some further research questions that 
we consider very high on the evolutionary research agenda. 
Learning and selection 
Coupled with learning, the other major tenet of evolutionary theory is, of course, selection, 
that is some collective mechanism providing differential rewards and penalties (involving 
also differential diffusion and survival probabilities) to different traits (being they behaviours, 
routines, technologies, etc ...) of which the agents are so to speak  carrier^"^' More generally, 
we suggest almost all dynamics of socio-economic change fell somewhere in between the two 
extreme archetypes of "pure learning" and "pure selection". The former corresponds to the 
extremist decision-theoretic or game-theoretic models : all agents make the best use of the 
available information, are endowed with identical information-processing algorithms, etc. 
(representative-agent, rational expectation models are the most striking example). Clearly, 
62 In economics, principallagent models as well as transaction cost theories of course try to do that. But , in the 
former case they do it by reducing them to a sort of epiphenomenological 'veil' ,which is just a collective 
name for an ensemble of contracts among rational agents. Conversely, transaction cost models do fully 
acknowledge organisations as entities in their own right, but, in our view , they still fall short of providing a 
'physiology' of organisation themselves, whereby governance procedures and problem-solving knowledge are 
reproduced and modified over time. 
For remarks in a similar spirit, cf. Padgett(l995), who also present a simple 'hypercycle model' of emergence 
of an 'ecology' of mutually consistent skills. 
See also Warglien (1995), on the evolution of organisational learning as a hierarchically nested process of 
selection among 'projects'. 
63 General discussions of selection processes in socio-economic evolution can be found in Nelson and Winter 
(1882), Hodgson (1988), Dosi and Nelson (1995), Witt (1992), Metcalfe (1994), Nelson (1995), Silverberg 
(1988), Winter (1988), among others. 
here selection plays no role since every agent has the same access to the available 
opportunities (i.e. in some loose sense, has the same "environmental fitness"). Conversely, in 
the opposite "Darwinian" archetype, nobody learns and system dynamics is driven by 
selection operating upon blindly generated variants of e.g. behaviours, technologies, etc. 
(taken literally this is also the "as..if" interpretation of rational behaviour). As briefly 
discussed earlier, the outcomes of the two dynamics, for whatever given environment, are 
equivalent only in some rather special cases. In general, the balance and interaction between 
learning and selection matters in terms of both finite-time properties of the process and long- 
term outcomes. 
An implication is also that the nature and intensity of selective mechanisms are not 
orthogonal to learning patterns. There might be subtle trade-offs here. Weak selective 
pressures most likely allow the persistence of "slack" and "inefficient" behaviours (no matter 
how "efficiency" is defined in a particular context). On the other hand, too strong selective 
pressure might hinder learning in so far as the latter involves trial-and-error processes, 
probably bound to be, on average. Failures. It is a dilemma that J. March has phrased in terms 
of "exploitation vs. exploration" (March (1991)). 
It can be seen also as a time-scale issue : learning and selection might well proceed at 
different paces. So for example, even the tightest selection environment can leave room for 
individual learning provided that selection is a low frequency event as compared to the rates 
of searchllearning. In biology, selection takes place at a generational time scale. Hence the 
trade-off is very clear : individual learning is favoured by having long-living organisms, 
while collective evolution takes advantage of short-living organisms and frequent 
generational renewal. Conversely, in the social domain the picture is more complicated : 
environments such as markets are not only fundamental selection mechanisms, but also an 
essential source for feed-backs which stirs learning processes. 
Low frequency feed-backs can slow down and render "opaque" individual learning but a 
frequent and tight application of selective forces might leave little room for experimentation 
and innovation. Moreover, note that the cultural reproduction of knowledge and behaviours 
within economic institutions introduces strong "Larnarkian" features into the relationships 
between learning and selection. 
Another, related, issue concerns the possible tension between individual and collective 
learning : for example, it might well happen that persistent individual mistakes (e.g. decision 
biases) turn out to have a positive collective role (an interpretation along these lines of the 
process of entry of business firms is in Dosi and Lovallo (1995) but a lot more needs to be 
done in order to explore the value of this conjecture). 
Learning, path-dependencv and co-evolution 
A quite general property of learning processes is often their path-dependent nature. This 
sometimes holds even under quite conventional learning mechanisms and even more so in 
evolutionary environments. Of course, path-dependency implies that initial conditions and/or 
early fluctuations along the learning path shape long term outcomes. Furthermore, if learning 
entails the development of rather inertial cognitive frames and routinised action rules, one 
64 For example, this is true for Bayesian learning if the set of events upon which agents form their priors is 
different, and also in finite-time if agents hold the same priors but are exposed to different sample paths. And 
it appears as a limit property of environments where Bayesian agents sample across other bayesian agents in 
order to decide among alternative options (cf. Arthur and Lane (1993)). 
should expect inertia and "lock-in" to be indeed one of the corollaries of the very fact that 
"agents have learned". 
Above, we have surveyed a few models of e.g. technological learning, etc., which do generate 
path-dependency, lock-in, etc. even in rather simple environments, driven by some forms of 
dynamic increasing returns or social adaptation. A more complicated and fascinating 
question concerns those path-dependent outcomes which are driven by the correlation across 
(cognitive, behavioural, organisational) traits, which in biology comes under the heading of 
epistatic correlation (cf. Levinthal (1996a) for a suggestive exploratory application to the 
analysis of organisational "inertia") 6 5 .  The basic intuition is simple. Suppose that, say, 
cognitive and behavioural repertoires come as rather folded packages - either due to some 
proximate internal coherence, or simply to the fact that originally they randomly happened to 
come together -. For example, in the above formal framework, suppose that the set of 
representations/actions which turned out to be "learned" involves the rule rp mapping an 
"understanding" of the world in terms of (e1,e2, ...) into procedures (c1,c2, ....) Suppose also 
that that rule happened to "win" because in an environment with "true" states which are 
cognitively coded under 6,, procedure ci was reinforced by the obtained payoffs. However, 
under some other states , which, say, are coded in ej, triggering c,, , the decision rule is 
strikingly bad. Of course, with no trait correlation, agents would hold on, to that part of the 
original rule that links 6, to ci and change the rest of the repertoire by merging it with e.g. 
representation 6, and intended action kk . However, suppose that the first "package" can be 
hardly unbundled, and so does the other one where, say ek ck and come also correlated 
within another "model" yielding "bad" responses under the states coded under 6,. One can 
intuitively see here how some system interrelatedness can easily produce inertia and lock-in 
(cf. David (1995), discussing also the appealing analogy between technological and 
institutional systems). 
It is important to notice that interrelatedness and trait correlation are far from being 
theoretical curiosa. Rather, they are almost intrinsic properties of all entities embodying 
relatively coherent inner structures. This applies to knowledge systems, as well as business 
organisations and all other institutions. (A deeper understanding of this correlation draws 
back to the challenge of developing constructive theories of these entities themselves, 
mentioned earlier, ...) 
The ramifications of this point are even broader , linking with the idea of learninp as a co- 
evolutionarv process. It is quite straightforward from our earlier discussion that the general 
view of learning that we propose rests on the co-evolution between cognitive representations, 
behavioural repertoires and preferences. In a nutshell, this implies a notion of mutual 
adaptation, not only, of course, along the canonical sequence from what one believes to know 
to what one does, judged according to what one deems to be better for himself, but also the 
other way round, from what one does to what one has to believe in order to justify what has 
been done, and from what one gets to what one likes . 
Preference and exuectation 
We have presented above some tentative insights toward the formalisation of the co-evolution 
between mental models and action repertoires. Two other domains, however have been so far 
largely neglected, namely expectation formation and endogenous preferences. With regards 
to expectations, the rather unfortunate state-of-the-art is that one is largely stuck between a 
65 Kauffman's model of biological evolution is an acknowledged source of inspiration (Kauffman (1993)). 
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rational expectation paradigm which basically assumes agents who already know what they 
are supposed to learn and various extrapolative expectation mechanisms. Between the two, 
evolutionary modellers tend, rightly so, to choose the latter as a first approximation (cf. for 
example, Chiaramonte et al. (1993)), but, sooner or later, one should try to model agents that 
elaborate conjectures about the "structure of the world and its parametrisation and test them 
against experience. More precisely, this is indeed what adaptive learning models do (e.g. 
Holland et a1 (1986), Marengo and Tordjman (1996), etc.), but the drawback is that one either 
has "pure forecast" models (whereby the triggered "action" is the forecast itself) or models 
where forecast and action-selection (concerning e.g. price-levels, selling-or buying, etc.) are 
folded together. A major step forward would be, in our view, the development of models 
whereby search in the space of expectations on the states-of-the-world and search in the space 
of actions is partly de-coupled 66. A consequence would be also the possibility of handling 
the coexistence of partly conflicting systems of beliefs and action patterns 67, and it would 
allow also an explicit account of phenomena like cognitive dissonance (Festinger (1957), 
Hirshman(l965) and Akerlof and Dickens (1972) for some economic applications) 68. 
This leads directly to the issue of endogenous preferences. Some progress has been recently 
made toward modelling preferences as influenced by social interactions (cf. e.g. Kuran (1987) 
and Brock and Durlauf (1995)). The time is possibly ripe to take the issue further, right into 
the foundational model of agency, and account for the endogeneity of the criteria by which 
representations, actions and "payoffs" are evaluated, certainly as a result of social imitation, 
but also driven by attempts to adjust "desires" to realised outcomes. (A probably apocryphal 
citation of Joseph Stalin, mentions his definition of "pure happiness as the perfect 
correspondence between expectations and reality" ( ! !) : certainly he was trying hard to work 
on the former...). So far, these phenomena have been neglected by adaptive learning models : 
indeed, an aspect that we consider rather unsatisfactory is the general assumption of an 
invariant payoff function, which also drives the learning process, by providing the yardstick 
against which the outcomes of cognition/action are judged. Our proposal, on the contrary, in 
our earlier language, is to render the n: function endogenous -an implication being also that 
one disposes of any notion of "utility" as one of the primitives of the theory and 
operationalises on idea of adaptive identities of agents much nearer a lot of sociological 
intuitions. 
Co-evolutionary determinants of routines and other organisational traits 
Isomorphic issues appear also at higher levels of description. Consider, for example, the co- 
evolution of technologies, business organisations and related institutions, raised in an 
appreciative theorising mode by Nelson (1994) ; or the multiple nature of routines as 
procedures for both problem-solving and governance of conflict (Coriat and Dosi (1995a)). 
In all these cases, organisational learning is driven by multiple, and possibly contradictory, 
selection mechanisms (for example, success in innovative search but also control over the 
66 See a preliminary attempt in Riolo (1990). 
67 Think for example of action patterns that continue to be implemented because they "work" even if they 
conflict with agent-held theories. Speculative behaviour involving both a rule "buy as long as the market is 
bullish" and expectation "the market is going to collapse" belong to this class (we owe this observation to H. 
Tordjman). 
68 The fact that the belief system and the action system remain partly coupled, generally entails imperfect 
attempts to reduce cognitive dissonance by modifying also the system of beliefs in order to accommodate the 
action patterns. Every smoker, for example, is familiar with such exercises!! In a very similar vein, we plan 
to call a model of this kind, that we are beginning to build, "the spirit is strong, but the flesh is weak.."(!?) 
possibility of opportunistic or conflictual behaviours, and political "coherence" of the 
organisation, etc.) 69. On all that there is a wealth of empirical evidence and one starts having 
some appreciative theories : it might be worth beginning to explore also some simple formal 
models whereby organisational learning concerns the development of collectively-shared 
cognitive models and action repertoires which, so to speak, "make sense" according to 
multiple dimensions (implying also that what members of the organisation "know", do and 
believe to be their interests, co-evolve.). 
A major implication of all that is also that evolutionary theories of learning might head 
toward the hierarchically nested levels of description of learning processes lo, possibly related 
to different learning entities. At one extreme, one is only beginning to explore the dynamics 
of, so to speak, "agentless" organisations where learning is driven by evolution under some 
selective pressure upon bundles of routines, skills, etc. (preliminary efforts are in Marengo 
(1996), Padgett (1995)). At the other extreme, it seems equally promising to explore explicit 
agent-based models where collective knowledge emerge from the endogenous networking 
among entities embodying diverse pieces of knowledge7'. 
Somewhere in between, as discussed at greater length in Coriat and Dosi (1995a), a major 
challenge ahead is modelling agents which imperfectly learn how to adapt (in terms of skills, 
behaviours, goals) to existing institutions while the imperfectness of adaptation itself is a 
fundamental source of institutional changeT2. 
There is a lot on the plate. It seems to us that one faces nowadays the possibility of an 
interdisciplinary construction of a positive theory of agency and learning whose scope goes 
well beyond the limits of applicability of the usual (rational) decision-theoretic model. And, 
for the first time, one is beginning to develop the instruments to make it "harder" - able to 
generate also formal "toy models" that, moreover, have a positive interaction with models 
based on more orthodox notions of rationality. (Although, in our view, it will never be able 
to present the axiomatic "hardness" of the latter, notwithstanding its measure-zero empirical 
content, whenever stripped of any phenomenological restrictions). 
As economists, we are tempted to call this emerging approach with the labels of 
"evolutionary" or "institutionalists". But, in other disciplines similar approaches come under 
quite different headings. Moreover, even within the economists' arena, a few "revisionists" 
developments building on "bounded rationality", "far-from-equilibrium learning", etc. 
promise challenging dialogues. Nowadays, it is certainly far too early to know whether it will 
turn out to be scientifically more fruitful to pursue some equivalent of a "new Ptolemaic 
synthesis" or conversely, some more radical views, still largely to be developed. Where our 
inclinations are should be clear from this essay. In any case, whether one succeeds or not, it 
remains important to establish sort of equivalence classes, partly mapping problems and 
69 A few more comments are in Dosi (1995a). 
70 An exploratory attempt is in Warglien (1995). 
7' Which would indeed put on more rigorous grounds also the Hayekian proposition on capitalist institutions 
(including markets) as mechanisms for the coordination of distributed knowledge (cf. also Egidi (1996) and 
Lane et al. (1996)). 
72 One can easily see how this could represent also a major bridge between evolutionary theories and 
institutionalist analyses of the mechanism holding together and changing the social fabric (a thorough 
discussion of many related issues in Hodgson (1988)). Enormously difficult but fascinating issues such as e.g. 
the dynamic coupling between institutions and economic behaviours; and the role of trust and power come 
under this broad headings. 
formal instruments across different approaches. This kind of bridge is also part of what we 
have tried to do in this paper. But, of course, it will never be long enough to reach rationality 
fanatics and drunk men who search for their lost house-key under some street light even if 
they know they forgot somewhere else .... 
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